Iran war: an inventory of the oil and gas ships and infrastructure struck

The energy dimension of this war reads not only in the price of the barrel or in the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, subjects we have covered elsewhere. It also inscribes itself in a concrete accounting, that of the facilities and hulls struck. This article proposes its inventory, at a given date and with a demand for method, because such a count is worth only as much as the quality and caution of its sources.

A method, and its limits

Two categories of target call for two levels of confidence. For infrastructure, the best sources are the investigations of Human Rights Watch, supported by satellite imagery and the statements of operators such as QatarEnergy, Shell or the National Iranian Gas Company. The degree of certainty is high there: you see the damage, you date it, you measure it. For ships, the material is more heterogeneous, and we have anchored it to first-order maritime sources. The reference authority is the UKMTO, the UK Maritime Trade Operations liaison office, which recorded at least 52 incident reports in the Arabian-Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman by the end of May 2026, between attacks, suspicious activity and hijackings. The joint maritime information centre, the JMIC, rated the threat as critical at the height of the crisis, an attack being judged nearly inevitable, before lowering it to severe in June. The intelligence firm Ambrey and the protection and indemnity clubs complete this base. These sources are authoritative on the count and on the severity, but they often anonymise the vessels: identification by name, and above all by IMO number, the unique fingerprint of a hull, then comes from the specialist press and maritime intelligence, sometimes from belligerents’ claims that no neutral investigator has verified. When these sources diverge, we favour the first order: thus the Skylight, which some compilations gave as two dead, is described by the UKMTO as having caused four injuries.

Three cautions therefore apply. This inventory is one of what is documented, not a guarantee of exhaustiveness: some incidents may have escaped the count, others been counted twice under different names. The damage descriptions range from a lightly damaged vessel to a sunk ship, and this gradation matters as much as the raw count. Finally, attribution, who struck whom, is often claimed but rarely proven. We therefore list what is reported, weighting it by its source.

The energy infrastructure

The turning point came on 7 March 2026, with the first Israeli strikes on Iranian oil facilities, four depots around Tehran. The escalation peaked on 18 March with the attack on the South Pars gas field and the Asaluyeh facilities, then the Iranian retaliation on the Gulf’s energy sites. South Pars, the world’s largest gas field and the heart of the Iranian energy system, supplies about 80% of the country’s gas and feeds nearly 79% of its electricity production. According to imagery analysed by Human Rights Watch and confirmed on the ground, several refineries in the complex were fire-damaged, refinery number 4, the largest, being almost entirely destroyed. The attack affected about 12% of Iranian gas production and interrupted gas deliveries to Iraq.

In retaliation, Iran struck Ras Laffan, in Qatar, which alone provides nearly a fifth of world LNG. Human Rights Watch documented there, by satellite and via QatarEnergy and Shell, severe damage: liquefaction lines 4 and 6, 12.8 million tonnes a year and 17% of Qatari exports, and line 2 of the Pearl gas-to-liquids plant. Repairs are estimated at up to five years for the LNG. Other Gulf and Israeli sites were hit, as the table below summarises.

Site	Country	Date	Nature of damage (source)
Four oil depots, Tehran region	Iran	7 March	First Israeli strikes on Iranian oil (Al Jazeera, HRW)
South Pars gas field, refineries 3 to 7	Iran	18 March	Refinery 4 nearly destroyed, fire, ~12% of Iranian gas, ~100 Mm³/d halted (HRW, NIGC)
Asaluyeh petrochemical complex	Iran	18 March	Storage tanks and gas facilities damaged (Al Jazeera, HRW)
Ras Laffan, LNG (lines 4 and 6) and Pearl GTL	Qatar	18-19 March	Severe damage, 17% of Qatari exports, repairs up to 5 years (HRW, QatarEnergy, Shell)
Two refineries	Kuwait	18-19 March	Hit by Iranian fire (PBS)
Gas facilities, Abu Dhabi	UAE	18-19 March	Operations suspended after 13 missiles and 27 drones (Wikipedia South Pars)
Haifa refinery	Israel	18-19 March	Power outage of about 45 minutes (Wikipedia South Pars)
Ports of Duqm and Salalah, fuel storage	Oman	March	At least one fuel tank damaged at Duqm (incident compilations)

The oil and gas ships

The second front is maritime, and it was particularly intense from the opening of the conflict, when traffic had not yet been rerouted. Daily traffic in the strait fell from about 138 vessels to a handful per day by early June, according to the UKMTO. The table below lists the oil- and gas-related vessels, tankers, chemical, bitumen or liquefied-petroleum-gas carriers, reported struck, seized or disabled. The IMO numbers, the unique fingerprint of each hull, are shown when a first-order source confirms them. Container ships, bulk carriers and others, also numerous among those targeted, do not appear here, the inventory focusing on the subject’s scope.

Vessel	Flag	Type	Date	Location and nature (source)
Skylight (IMO 9330020)	Palau	tanker	28 February	Projectile 5 nm north of Khasab; 4 injured, evacuation (UKMTO)
MKD Vyom (IMO 9284386)	Marshall Islands	tanker	28 February	Projectile above the waterline, fire contained (UKMTO)
Sea La Donna (IMO 9380532)	Liberia	oil/chemical tanker	28 February	Attack under investigation (UKMTO)
Hercules Star	Gibraltar	tanker	1 March	Minor damage
Ocean Electra	Liberia	tanker	1 March	Minor damage
LCT Ayeh	UAE	tanker	1-2 March	Damaged
Stena Imperative	United States	products tanker	2 March	Port of Bahrain, struck twice; 1 worker killed
Athe Nova	Honduras	bitumen carrier	2 March	Struck by drones
Libra Trader	Marshall Islands	crude tanker	3 March	Minor damage
Sonangol Namibe	Bahamas	tanker	4 March	Sea drone near Mubarak Al Kabeer port (Kuwait); oil spill
Prima	Malta	oil/chemical tanker	7 March	Drone attack (IRGC claim)
Louis P	Marshall Islands	tanker	7 March	Drone attack (IRGC claim)
Safesea Vishnu	Marshall Islands	tanker	11 March	Set ablaze; 1 dead (Iranian navy claim)
Zefyros	Malta	tanker	11 March	Set ablaze, abandoned
Gas Al Ahmadiah	Kuwait	LPG carrier	17 March	Projectile east of Fujairah, minor damage
Parimal	Palau	chemical tanker	18 March	Fire; captain missing
Al Salmi	Kuwait	supertanker (VLCC)	31 March	Drone at Dubai port; fire
Aqua 1	Panama	tanker	1 April	Projectiles north of Doha
Barakah	UAE (ADNOC)	tanker	3 May	Two drones north of Fujairah; empty
Ocean Koi	Barbados	tanker	8 May	Seized by Iran
Sevan	Panama	propane-butane carrier	25 April	Seized by the United States
Marivex	Palau	tanker	8 June	Disabled by the United States, Gulf of Oman
Settebello	Palau	tanker	9 June	Disabled by the United States; 3 sailors killed
Jalveer	Guinea-Bissau	tanker	10 June	Disabled by the United States, Gulf of Oman
Kiku	Panama	tanker	27 June	Projectile in the strait

To this count are added several Iranian tankers seized by the US Navy as part of the naval blockade, including the Deep Sea, the Dorena, the Sevin, the Derya, the Tifani and the Majestic X, captured between April and May off India, Malaysia and in the Indian Ocean. These seizures stem from a blockade logic more than destruction, and must be distinguished from vessels damaged in combat.

The lessons of the count

Three lessons emerge from this survey. The first is chronological: the maritime violence was concentrated on the first weeks, in March, before the rerouting of traffic mechanically reduced the number of targets. The second is the double-acting nature of the strikes on infrastructure: each side targeted the other’s energy core, Iran losing part of South Pars, Qatar part of Ras Laffan, in a destructive symmetry where the weapon is world supply itself. The third is human, often forgotten behind the tonnages: several sailors and at least one port worker perished in the recorded attacks on ships, the exact tolls varying by source, and the crews, often from South Asia, paid the heaviest price.

This material cost translates into economic cost, which we have quantified elsewhere. The strike on South Pars and Ras Laffan sent the barrel jumping from $103 to $108 and European gas up 7% in a few hours, and the Ras Laffan damage, repairable in five years at most, will leave a durable imprint, as our analysis of the supply chain after Hormuz shows. The inventory of hulls and sites is not merely a macabre accounting: it is the physical fabric of a shock whose price still reads on the markets.

Sources

1. Human Rights Watch, “Israel, Iran: Unlawful March Attacks on Energy Infrastructure”, 22 April 2026: satellite analysis and operator statements, South Pars damage (refineries 3 to 7, refinery 4 nearly destroyed, ~12% of Iranian gas) and Ras Laffan (lines 4 and 6, Pearl GTL, 17% of Qatari exports, repairs up to five years): https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/04/22/israel-iran-unlawful-march-attacks-on-energy-infrastructure
2. Human Rights Watch, “Iran: Israel’s Oil Depot Strikes Endanger Environment, Health”, 14 April 2026: strikes on oil depots, health and environmental risks: https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/04/14/iran-israels-oil-depot-strikes-endanger-environment-health
3. Wikipedia, “2026 South Pars field attack”: date and course of the 18 March strike, South Pars supplying 80% of Iran’s gas and 79% of its electricity, Gulf retaliation, Haifa refinery, price impact: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_South_Pars_field_attack
4. Al Jazeera, “Iran oil facilities hit for first time as war with US-Israel enters day 9”, 8 March 2026: first Israeli strikes on Iranian oil depots: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/8/israel-strikes-irans-oil-facilities-for-first-time-as-war-enters-ninth-day
5. PBS News, “Iran intensifies attacks on Gulf energy sites after Israel struck its key gas field”: Iranian retaliation on Gulf energy sites, Kuwaiti refineries: https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/iran-intensifies-attacks-on-gulf-energy-sites-after-israel-struck-its-key-gas-field
6. Wikipedia, “2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis”: consolidated table of merchant ships attacked, seized or disabled, with flags, types, dates and human toll, aggregating press and maritime security advisories: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Strait_of_Hormuz_crisis
7. ABC News, escalation of attacks on commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz: https://abcnews.com/International/attacks-strait-hormuz-intensify-iran-targeted-commercial-ships/story?id=130962627
8. NPR, “Tanker set ablaze after being struck by projectile in the Strait of Hormuz”, 7 July 2026: https://www.npr.org/2026/07/07/g-s1-132265/tanker-attack-strait-of-hormuz
9. PBS News, “U.S. fires on and disables 2 more Iranian tankers as tensions rise in the Strait of Hormuz”: Iranian vessels disabled by the US Navy: https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/u-s-fires-on-and-disables-2-more-iranian-tankers-as-tensions-rise-in-the-strait-of-hormuz
10. UKMTO (UK Maritime Trade Operations), recent incidents and 2026 advisories: reference authority on the incident count, raising of the threat level, GNSS/AIS/VHF jamming: https://www.ukmto.org/recent-incidents
11. Skuld (protection and indemnity club), Gulf and Hormuz maritime security update: at least 52 incident reports to the UKMTO by late May 2026, JMIC threat levels (critical then severe), named vessels with IMO number (Skylight IMO 9330020, MKD Vyom IMO 9284386, Sea La Donna IMO 9380532), traffic down from about 138 to a handful of vessels a day, Ambrey’s role: https://www.skuld.com/topics/port/port-news/asia/maritime-security-update-gulf-region--strait-of-hormuz-and-red-sea/
12. Euronews, 27 June 2026, raising of the threat level in the Strait of Hormuz by the UK maritime agency after a tanker reported being struck: https://www.euronews.com/2026/06/27/uk-maritime-agency-raises-strait-of-hormuz-threat-level-after-oil-tanker-reports-being-str