// analysis
Russia’s shadow fleet: oil proceeds and the A7 payment network
Open the documentsThe source documents
The documents cited in the analysis and, where identified, their associated passages. An automatically detected association is not a verified claim.
- Treasury: OFAC sanctions and proposed measures concerning A7 ↗Source date not identified
- FinCEN: proposed special measure concerning A7 sub-agents ↗05/10/2026

Sources and reading context
Topics
Contents8 sections
In May 2026, Britain accused the Russian payment network A7 of handling proceeds from oil sales. In a separate filing, US financial intelligence agency FinCEN identifies at least 179.1 billion dollars in A7A5 transactions between February 2025 and June 2026. That total adds up token transactions whose commercial purpose has yet to be established individually. Once oil is sold, the cargo and its payment leave different records. S04 · S10
We first traced ownership of the tanker Arrow, then a loan raised in Moscow for Lidoil in Dubai. This instalment follows a separate case. An oil sale abroad generates proceeds in foreign currency. The seller still needs money where its own bills fall due. A7 markets payment services to both importers and exporters. S03 · S04 · S25
Liquidity on both sides of the border
Britain’s National Crime Agency describes offshore pools of money and payment intermediaries in its August 2026 alert. The economics come from matching different needs. An exporter wants roubles after receiving money abroad. An importer has roubles and needs to pay a foreign supplier. An intermediary can bring these demands together using money already available on either side. The service depends on how much cash it can mobilise when payments fall due. The NCA presents this as a typology based on a limited level of review. S03 · S04
A7 also describes the use of a veksel, a promissory note that records an obligation to pay. The FAQ describes a payment note denominated in roubles. The terms of the separate interest-bearing note with foreign-currency face value also specify repayment in roubles. For the customer, the note’s value depends on the issuer’s ability to honour that obligation. Tracing one of those notes to a paid invoice would require records from the issuer and the customer. S01 · S02
Oil proceeds in the public record
The Big Shor, published in June by the Open Source Centre with TRM Labs, documents offshore pools using internal records. Its authors treat funding from energy proceeds as a lead supported by partial evidence. The NCA and FinCEN cite that report, so part of their account draws on the same material. A separate investigation by the Centre for Information Resilience describes intermediaries in the network. FinCEN says it also drew on information outside the public record. S03 · S04 · S05 · S08 · S21
Attributing a payment to a specific cargo would require the invoice, proof of payment and shipping documents. FinCEN’s October alert says trade documents can disguise the real customer and that financial institutions can handle transactions without knowing the underlying arrangement. A bank’s role in a transfer establishes one stage of processing. Establishing what the bank knew would require other evidence. S05
Token volume and the value of invoices
The A7A5 project says that its stablecoin aims to track the rouble and is backed by bank deposits. In its proposal published on 5 October 2026, FinCEN identifies more than 17 billion dollars in dollar-denominated transactions processed by the network’s sub-agents from January 2025 to June 2026. The minimum of 179.1 billion dollars covers A7A5 transactions over a different period. Each figure measures its own category of activity and time window. S04 · S11
The same tokens can enter a transaction total several times. If 100 tokens change hands three times, the recorded volume is 300 tokens. Supply remains 100 in the absence of issuance or destruction. Transfers may represent payments, movements between accounts or treasury operations. Sorting them requires the economic context. S04 · S12
TRM Labs estimated that about 34% of the A7A5 trading volume studied for its annual report was likely artificial. This applies to the trading activity TRM covered. FinCEN counted a different set of transactions over a different period. Applying TRM’s percentage to FinCEN’s total would combine incompatible measures. S04 · S12
The issuer’s powers
A7A5’s public source code provides for a pause in transfers and a blocklist. It also allows tokens held at a blocked address to be destroyed, subject to administrative roles. For the Ethereum address named by the project, the repository file and the source published by Blockscout match byte for byte. Blockscout marks the contract as partially verified. The current holders of the administrative keys and deployments on other networks fall outside this check. S15 · S16 · S23
Decurity’s January 2025 code audit excludes centralisation risks at the client’s request. The project’s documentation also lists custody, liquidity and redemption risks. The public address for an earlier reserve report now returns an application page. Verifying current reserve balances would require further records. S14 · S17 · S20
The token’s decline and A7’s reported activity
Elliptic estimates that A7A5 transfers averaged 24.3 million dollars a day in June 2026, a 96% fall from the July 2025 peak. Its analysis, published on 29 July, cites possible drivers including sanctions and access to exchanges. S13
On 18 November, an A7 executive told Reuters that activity across the network had risen and that customers were mostly in agriculture and metals. His description covers the company’s wider services over a different period from Elliptic’s study. A comparison of the network over time would require a consistently defined measure of payments actually completed. S13 · S19
US sanctions and the proposed rule
The US Treasury announced the network’s designation by OFAC on 1 October 2026. The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, or FinCEN, separately proposed a measure for certain transfers involving the network’s sub-agents by covered institutions. On 19 November, FinCEN’s official index still lists the measure as a proposal. A case involving nearly 140 million dollars in the US documents concerns entities FinCEN links to the evasion of Iranian sanctions. A7 disputed any links to Iran, Reuters reported. S04 · S06 · S07 · S24
In its annual results published in March 2026, Rosneft’s management said barriers to international payments had pushed up the cost of settlement and currency conversion. It listed several factors affecting its results. The statement gives a commercial stake to the investigation. Every additional delay widens the gap between a sale and the cash the company can spend. Measuring that cost or delay would require records for individual transactions. S18
Scope of the investigation
The investigation covers documents available on 19 November 2026. We attribute official allegations, commercial estimates and company statements to their authors. The records describe a payment network and its reported links to oil proceeds. The evidence stops short of bank statements, matched cargoes or a payment attributable to Arrow, Citrine or Lidoil. Company responses are drawn from the cited publications. The cover image is an AI-generated illustration.
Sources
- A7: questions on foreign-trade settlement
Passages and scope
Payment FAQ. A7 describes the service and the role of its promissory notes in its own commercial materials.
- A7-Agent: bill-of-exchange product terms
Passages and scope
Definitions and sections 3.1, 3.6.1 and 3.6.2. The issuer describes the relevant notes and payment in roubles.
- NCA: A7 Sanctions Evasion Mechanism, Flash Alert 0808-NECC
Passages and scope
PDF p. 1: scope; pp. 4–5: external treasuries and sub-agents; notes 2–10. Typology alert with expressly limited analytical status. Partly relies on OSC and CIR; matching a typology does not establish illegality.
- FinCEN: proposed special measure concerning A7 sub-agents
Passages and scope
Federal Register pp. 63208–63226; PDF 1–19. Mechanism 63212–63214; amounts and Iran cases 63214–63215; proposed text 63225–63226. Administrative findings based on public sources, BSA and non-public information. Proposal distinct from a final rule. USD 17bn and USD 179.1bn have different perimeters.
- FinCEN Alert on the A7 Network, FIN-2026-Alert007
Passages and scope
PDF p. 1: provenance; p. 2: documents and payments; pp. 5–6: token and limits of red flags. Same institutional family as S04 and S06. Some banks may be unaware of underlying clients. No single indicator determines whether a transaction is suspicious.
- Treasury: OFAC sanctions and proposed measures concerning A7
Passages and scope
A7 designated / Sanctions implications sections. Effective OFAC designation, distinct from the FinCEN proposal. Reasons attributed to Treasury within US jurisdiction; no inference of a uniform worldwide prohibition.
- FinCEN: official Special Measures index
Passages and scope
A7 Network Sub-Agents entry. Proposal dated 1 October and a blank final-rule column on the access date.
- The Big Shor: A7 and the illusion of Russian financial innovation
Passages and scope
PDF pp. 7–9: method; pp. 30–31: bills; pp. 41–44: documents; pp. 46–50: external treasuries and hypotheses. Original investigation of leaked records. l0g read the report but did not obtain or authenticate the underlying corpus. Energy funding of external treasuries is a hypothesis in this section. Institutional reuse is source-dependent.
- FCDO: A7 and the processing of oil proceeds
Passages and scope
Paragraph beginning “The A7 network is a Kremlin-backed system”. UK government claim linking the network to oil proceeds. This release provides no named bank transaction records.
- A7A5: project documentation
Passages and scope
Introduction: peg, deposits and stated mechanism. Project claims rouble backing and bank deposits. No contemporary bank statement obtained; a peg claim is distinct from assured liquidity. Web retrieval; no original file attached for this reference.
- TRM Labs: 2026 Crypto Crime Report
Passages and scope
Russia section, paragraph on approximately 34% of A7A5 trading volume. Commercial estimate of likely artificial trading. Applies to TRM’s trading sample; cannot automatically adjust FinCEN transfer data.
- The fall of A7A5: how sanctions strangled the ruble stablecoin
Passages and scope
The collapse, in numbers; Figure 1; proposed contributing factors. USD 24.3m daily average in June; reported 96% decline. Derived approximate index 100 → 4. Commercial estimate not replicated by l0g; multiple causes, no causal decomposition.
- A7A5: Information on the Risks
Passages and scope
Custodial Risks; Liquidity Risks; Smart Contract Vulnerabilities. Project acknowledges custody, liquidity, redemption and code risks. These documents establish no universal right to USD redemption.
- Published A7A5.sol source code
Passages and scope
Ethereum source published by the project. Administrative roles allow pausing, blocking and destroying tokens held at affected addresses.
- Blockscout: published source for A7A5’s Ethereum contract
Passages and scope
Source for the Ethereum contract listed by the project. The published file matches the repository byte for byte. Blockscout reports partial verification.
- Decurity: A7A5 Token Smart Contract Security Audit Report
Passages and scope
P. 3, sections 2.1 to 2.3. January 2025 code review. The scope excludes centralisation risks at the client’s request.
- Rosneft: 2025 IFRS results and commentary on payments
Passages and scope
Management commentary: cross-border settlement, conversion costs and EBITDA factors. Interested management statement on higher costs. No isolated causal effect or l0g cargo-level cost estimate.
- Russia’s A7 payment network plans further expansion in Africa, executive says
Passages and scope
Stanislav Lazarev’s statements on clients and activity. A7 claims mainly agricultural and metallurgical clients and growing activity. Unaudited company claims; distinct from June A7A5 volume.
- A7A5: reserve-report URL, original unavailable
Passages and scope
Former report URL. The response is an application page. No reserve figures are taken from that response.
- A7 Abroad: How A7 Sells International Sanctions Evasion as a Service
Passages and scope
Original reporting on intermediaries. The report describes the records reviewed and the limits of links drawn from public traces.
- A7A5: official site and contract links
Passages and scope
Public configuration: documentation, GitHub repository and explorers. Provenance of the Ethereum address examined. Static files downloaded without executing code or probing private services.
- Russia’s A7 payment platform denies links to Iran after US sanctions
Passages and scope
A7 response concerning Iran-related activities. Denial reported by Reuters. Public response distinct from independent evidence that no operations occurred.
- A7: French-language international-services presentation
Passages and scope
A7’s own presentation of its services for importers and exporters.
This analysis is not investment advice.
// cite this analysis
l0g, “Russia’s shadow fleet: oil proceeds and the A7 payment network”, l0g.fr, published November 19, 2026, updated November 19, 2026, https://l0g.fr/en/analysis/shadow-fleet-oil-payments-a7-a7a5/
$ cd ../analysis