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Renewable curtailment: who pays when a wind or solar farm stops?

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Illustration for the analysis: Renewable curtailment: who pays when a wind or solar farm stops?
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dated revision: November 22, 2026primary sourcesno tracker
Contents6 sections

A solar farm can have all the sunlight it needs at noon and still cut output. If the line carrying its electricity away is full, the grid operator can limit how much the farm puts onto the system. If the wholesale price falls below zero, the operator of the farm may decide that selling another megawatt-hour would cost it money. Either way, the meter records less generation than the site could have delivered. Finding out who bears the cost starts with who called for the cut and under which contract. S01 · S02 · S04

Two reasons to cut output

Renewable curtailment means reducing generation below the available output. In the International Energy Agency (IEA) definition of technical curtailment, a grid operator instructs a plant to cut generation to manage a network or system constraint. A line out of a particular area can fill up even when the national wholesale price is positive. Equally, a negative price can make some farms choose to stop while they still have room to deliver power. S01 · S02 · S04

Across the key markets it studies, the IEA estimates that technical curtailment of wind and solar reached nearly 200 TWh in 2025. Its main case puts the figure above 800 TWh in 2031, equivalent to nearly 8% of total variable renewable generation, according to the IEA. That projection incorporates assumptions about both the rollout of renewables and the system’s capacity to integrate them. S01

France’s transmission operator RTE tracks a different measure for mainland France. Its flexibility report estimates that wind and solar farms cut output by 0.5 TWh in 2023, 1.7 TWh in 2024 and about 3 TWh in 2025 during periods of negative wholesale prices. In its annual review, RTE separately reports around 0.1 TWh in 2025 from its requests to reduce output for system balancing. That figure covers a specific set of instructions. S02 · S03

Wind and solar output curtailed RTE estimates that French wind and solar output fell by 0.5 TWh in 2023, 1.7 in 2024 and about 3 in 2025 during periods of negative prices. Separately, the IEA estimates about 200 TWh of technical curtailment across the markets it covers in 2025 and projects more than 800 in 2031. The metrics have different scopes. Wind and solar output curtailed France · Output reduced during negative prices TWh 0 1 2 3 0.5 2023 1.7 2024 ≈ 3 2025 IEA · Technical curtailment ≈ 200 TWh 2025 · estimate > 800 TWh 2031 · projection
Wind and solar output curtailed RTE estimates that French wind and solar output fell by 0.5 TWh in 2023, 1.7 in 2024 and about 3 in 2025 during periods of negative prices. Separately, the IEA estimates about 200 TWh of technical curtailment across the markets it covers in 2025 and projects more than 800 in 2031. The metrics have different scopes. Wind and solar output curtailed France · Output cut at negative prices TWh 0 1 2 3 0.5 2023 1.7 2024 ≈ 3 2025 IEA · Technical curtailment ≈ 200 TWh 2025 · estimate > 800 TWh 2031 · projection
FIG. 01RTE estimates French output reductions during negative prices. The IEA separately estimates technical curtailment in its report. The 2031 figure is a projection.Sources S01 · S03

Negative prices spread through the day

French day-ahead electricity averaged €61/MWh in 2025. In the same year, RTE recorded 513 hours of negative prices, up from 352 in 2024. After the market moved to fifteen-minute trading intervals in October 2025, an hour is classified from the average of its four intervals. A farm selling into the wholesale market earns the price for its delivery interval. RTE links the midday dip to lower demand at those hours and more solar generation in France and its neighbours. S04

The trend continued in 2026. RTE estimates that wind and solar farms cut 2.5 TWh in the first half during negative-price periods, compared with 1.9 TWh in the first half of 2025. By 8 October 2026, France’s energy regulator CRE had counted 568 hours of negative day-ahead prices, more than in the whole of 2025. That count measures time on the wholesale market. The amount of energy curtailed also depends on wind and sunlight and on the contracts that govern the operating farms. S05 · S06

The contract determines who pays first

A farm selling directly to the market can avoid a cost by stopping when the price goes negative. A long-term power purchase agreement changes the calculation. CRE found contract terms that allow buyers to request a shutdown, compensate the producer and buy cheaper electricity on the market. The agreed price for delivery and the payment due if generation stops are separate clauses. S04 · S07

Some French market-premium contracts allow a payment for stopping in negative-price periods beyond a threshold and subject to the scheme’s conditions. Eligible support costs are funded through the state budget. EU law separately requires compensation from the grid operator requesting non-market redispatch, with an exception for producers that agreed to a connection without guaranteed firm delivery. Different events trigger those payments and different parties owe them. S04 · S08 · S09

Available power, reduced output A wind or solar plant can reduce its output at the grid operator’s request if the system faces a physical constraint, or shut down in response to an unfavourable price. Contract terms allocate the risk. Grid upgrades, storage and flexible demand can ease some constraints. Available power, reduced output Two triggers Sun and wind Available output Physical constraint Grid or system balance Market signal Unfavourable price Output reduced Fewer MWh delivered Contracts allocate the risk Grid upgrades, storage or flexible demand
Available power, reduced output A wind or solar plant can reduce its output at the grid operator’s request if the system faces a physical constraint, or shut down in response to an unfavourable price. Contract terms allocate the risk. Grid upgrades, storage and flexible demand can ease some constraints. Reduced output Two triggers Sun and wind Available output Physical constraint Grid or balancing Market signal Unfavourable price Output reduced Contracts allocate the risk Grid upgrades, storage or flexible demand
FIG. 02The operator can restrict injections to manage a physical constraint. A generator may also turn down when the price makes it uneconomic to run. Contract terms determine who bears the cost.Sources S04 · S07 · S09

Choosing between a battery and a power line

A battery can charge when electricity is plentiful and supply it later, with conversion losses and limits on its power, capacity and state of charge. Where it sits determines the service it provides. On the side where generation backs up, charging can temporarily reduce flows through a congested line. Flexible demand can also absorb some of the surplus in that area. Reinforcing the grid may address a more persistent constraint. Comparing the options means looking at the hours each one covers and its cost over time. S01 · S03 · S10 · S11

France’s regulator already sets a framework for RTE to make this trade-off. Occasional output cuts, with compensation where applicable, can defer or avoid some grid upgrades. The case depends on how often and for how long the network is constrained, the value of the power withheld and the cost of the proposed upgrade. Storage, new lines and occasional cuts serve different needs over the course of a year. On the demand side, the French Tempo tariff offers a familiar example of how a varying price can encourage customers to shift usage. S03 · S10

The value of a recovered MWh Compare the expected value of recovered electricity and grid services with the full cost of each recovery option. Storage involves losses and costs for connection or cycling. Grid upgrades and demand flexibility have costs of their own. When recovery costs exceed the value delivered, accepting some curtailment can cost less. This is a qualitative diagram with no monetary values or value scale. The value of a recovered MWh Local trade-off · Decision rule Value of recovery Energy and grid services Storage Investment, losses, cycling Grid or flexible demand Full cost of the alternative Compare each cost with the value of recovery Curtailment can cost less when recovery costs more than it is worth.
The value of a recovered MWh Compare the expected value of recovered electricity and grid services with the full cost of each recovery option. Storage involves losses and costs for connection or cycling. Grid upgrades and demand flexibility have costs of their own. When recovery costs exceed the value delivered, accepting some curtailment can cost less. This is a qualitative diagram with no monetary values or value scale. The value of a recovered MWh Local trade-off · Decision rule Value of recovery Energy and grid services Storage Investment, losses, cycling Grid or flexible demand Full cost of the alternative Compare value with each cost Curtailing can cost less if costs outweigh value.
FIG. 03Compare costs and benefits for each option at the same location and over the same period. The diagram shows the decision rule without assigning monetary values.Sources S01 · S03 · S10

Limits of a financial estimate

Pricing an output cut requires its timing, the applicable sale price, available generation and the compensation terms. A grid constraint also calls for its location and the cost of relieving it another way. Applying the annual average of €61/MWh to curtailed energy mixes hours and overlooks contracts. Public support, forgone revenue and avoided grid expenditure belong in separate calculations. A useful comparison starts with the specific farm and network line, using the rules that applied when output was cut. S04 · S07 · S10

For more on the physical limits of generation, read The Wet Megawatt. The opening image is a digitally generated editorial illustration.

Sources

  1. S01 · IEA · Published: 2026-11-06 · Accessed: 2026-11-22Renewables 2026, system integration
    Passages and scope

    Executive summary, discussion of technical curtailment and flexibility. The full report, pp. 67–68, describes coverage and assumptions. Estimate for 2025 and main case for 2031.

  2. S02 · RTE · Published: 2026-03-03 · Accessed: 2026-11-222025 Electricity Review, generation
    Passages and scope

    Wind and solar output modulation section. Estimates during negative spot prices and a separate measure of adjustments requested by RTE. Date of the full report.

  3. S03 · RTE · Published: 2026-04-16 · Accessed: 2026-11-22Electricity demand flexibility review
    Passages and scope

    Table on p. 10 and discussion on p. 33, annual estimates of output cuts during negative-price periods. Other sections cover flexible demand.

  4. S04 · RTE · Published: 2026-03-03 · Accessed: 2026-11-222025 Electricity Review, wholesale prices
    Passages and scope

    Spot prices, the hourly curve and negative prices. French average, negative-price hours, quarter-hour convention and incentives in certain contracts. Date of the full report.

  5. S05 · RTE · Published: 2026-07-16 · Accessed: 2026-11-22First-half 2026 Electricity Review
    Passages and scope

    Pages 5 and 49, §7.2. Output cuts during negative spot prices in the first half, with a comparison to the same period in 2025.

  6. S06 · CRE · Published: 2026-10-21 · Accessed: 2026-11-22Negative prices in wholesale electricity markets
    Passages and scope

    Summary and §1 of the linked report. Count as of 8 October 2026, using the average day-ahead price for each hour. Counts hours with a negative average.

  7. S07 · CRE · Published: 2025-04-10 · Accessed: 2026-11-22Review of long-term power purchase agreements
    Passages and scope

    §3.2.3, p. 40 of the PDF. Survey responses on shutdown clauses and compensation during negative prices. Terms vary from one deal to another.

  8. S08 · CRE · Published: date not specified · Accessed: 2026-11-22Funding public-service energy costs in France
    Passages and scope

    State-budget funding arrangements for eligible public-service costs. Scope covers public support generally.

  9. S09 · European Union · Published: 2019-06-14 · Accessed: 2026-11-22Regulation (EU) 2019/943, Article 13
    Passages and scope

    Article 13(7), compensation for non-market redispatch and the exception for connections without guaranteed firm delivery. Official Journal publication date.

  10. S10 · CRE · Published: 2025-03-20 · Accessed: 2026-11-22Transmission tariff and efficient grid sizing
    Passages and scope

    Pages 42–43 and §2.7.3.1–4. French framework for local flexibility and efficient sizing of the transmission network. Costs depend on project and location.

  11. S11 · RTE · Published: 2025-02-27 · Accessed: 2026-11-22Connecting stationary batteries to the grid
    Passages and scope

    Network development plan, fact sheet 8. Location and flow direction determine whether a battery relieves or adds to the local constraint.

This analysis is not investment advice.

// cite this analysis

l0g, “Renewable curtailment: who pays when a wind or solar farm stops?”, l0g.fr, published November 22, 2026, updated November 22, 2026, https://l0g.fr/en/analysis/renewable-curtailment/


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