How Washington can stop a Tehran-Dubai flight

The ticket had already been issued. On September 24, 2026, an Iran Airtour service from Tehran to Dubai was cancelled shortly before departure, according to a passenger interviewed by AFP. The journey was meant to connect two Middle Eastern countries. A third country, the United States, had helped make it impossible.

That same day, the UAE’s civil aviation authority confirmed the suspension of flights operated by Iranian airlines, both into and out of the Emirates, until further notice. It explicitly linked its decision to the American restrictions.

American pressure reaches the flight through local authorities and the businesses on which it depends: airports, suppliers and banks. In the UAE, the public suspension is documented. No particular bank or refuelling refusal has been identified for the Iran Airtour cancellation cited here.

By the next day, Najaf was no longer an alternative

On September 25, Reuters reported that Iranian services had been suspended at all four Iraqi airports that handled them: Baghdad, Najaf, Erbil and Sulaimaniya. Its account drew on sources and Iraqi state media. Earlier in the week, diverting Baghdad traffic to Najaf had still been under discussion. That fallback had now disappeared too.

On September 26, AFP reported that Baghdad was seeking a US exemption for certain airports, citing travel for medical care, education and religious visits. The announcement came from the Iraqi prime minister’s office. It described talks, not an exemption already granted or the resumption of services.

The proposed diversion to Najaf illustrates how fragile a fallback can be. Closing a second airport removes the replacement route and the connections that rely on it.

The declared American ambition was broader still. In a September 21 CNBC interview reported by AFP, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said Iranian airlines would be shut down around the world two days later. That was Washington’s stated objective. The suspensions documented so far do not establish that it has been achieved everywhere.

A flight needs more than an aircraft

An aircraft and crew cannot run a service on their own. Fuel, loading, ground equipment and coordination between the airline, airport and contractors all matter. France’s civil aviation authority describes these dependencies in its ground-handling safety material.

Consider a hypothetical fuel supplier based outside the United States and working with international banks. A sanctioned Iranian carrier asks it to provide fuel.

The supplier weighs the contract’s revenue against the risk of sanctions affecting its wider business. If access to financial services or other markets appears threatened, it may decline the delivery. That commercial calculation can be enough to prompt withdrawal, whatever the company thinks of American policy.

Executive Order 13902 provides, among other measures, for sanctions against persons giving certain forms of support to designated entities. That creates exposure for foreign partners. The supplier example explains the mechanism; it does not reconstruct an observed refusal on this route.

If an essential service disappears and no authorised substitute can be arranged in time, the flight cannot proceed. Owning the aircraft, having a crew and selling every seat cannot make up for that missing service.

The pressure reaches the airline’s partners

The first layer of restrictions applies to US persons and activities within American jurisdiction. OFAC, the Treasury office administering financial sanctions, sets out who is covered. Some foreign transactions are also subject to American rules, including particular dealings involving controlled goods or activities. Exemptions and permissions depend on the relevant sanctions programme.

Secondary sanctions expose foreign actors to American measures because of certain dealings with a sanctioned target. The flight can remain entirely outside the United States. Our analysis of the August package explains the sectoral powers behind this aviation action.

Under the framework explained by OFAC, certain forms of support can expose an entity to designation. Foreign banks also face potential restrictions on their US correspondent accounts if they knowingly conduct or facilitate significant financial transactions for designated parties. These are possible consequences under specified conditions, not automatic penalties for every transaction.

A correspondent account is an account one bank holds with another to obtain services, including payments. It helps a bank serve customers beyond its own network. The Bank for International Settlements explains the arrangement. Threatening that access can therefore put much more at stake than the cost of one aircraft’s fuel: other customers may rely on the same banking services.

The criteria need careful reading. For the significance of goods or services under this framework, OFAC’s FAQ 833 considers factors including value, frequency or number, nature and management awareness. This contextual assessment offers no general safe threshold for small dealings. Foreign banks face the significant-financial-transaction test described in FAQ 831 and the executive order.

Paying in euros is not a general solution. Executive Order 13902 does not limit its relevant support and banking criteria to dollar-denominated invoices. A different payment currency does not necessarily change the beneficiary or the service being provided. Those features, not just the currency symbol on an invoice, determine the exposure.

Decisions outside the United States translate this pressure into practice: a government suspends flights, a company reviews its contracts, a bank its exposure. Each decision has its own basis.

Why September 23 mattered

The sequence combines an expanded legal power, airline designations and the withdrawal of permissions. The table below sets out the main dates.

One transitional authorisation, General License DD, allowed certain previously authorised activities to be wound down. It expired at 12:01 a.m. US Eastern Daylight Time on September 23. It covered the transactions specified in the licence, not all business with every Iranian airline.

DD covered the wind-down of specified activities involving overflight payments, bunkering and emergency repairs, and temporary aircraft visits under J-1. Its deadline must be read within that scope. Local suspensions occurred in the same wider context, through separate decisions.

Key dates in 2026:

Date	Decision or event
August 24	Aviation added to the sectoral scope of Executive Order 13902.
September 8	New designations and suspension of permissions.
September 23	General License DD expires at 12:01 a.m. EDT, for its specified activities only.
September 24	UAE suspension confirmed.
September 25	All four relevant Iraqi airports have suspended services.
September 26	Baghdad seeks an exemption.

The security case has to be read carrier by carrier

The American justification concerns the use of commercial aviation for military purposes and the networks supplying aircraft and components. In its September 8 alert, FinCEN, the US financial intelligence bureau, named Mahan Air and Iran Air in connection with support for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. It described the movement of weapons, personnel and funds.

FinCEN participates in the sanctions policy: its alert presents the American case. The allegations therefore remain attributed to the authorities making them, and to the carriers and activities they identify.

There is a separate European decision. On October 14, 2024, the Council of the European Union sanctioned Saha Airlines, Mahan Air and Iran Air, citing transfers to Russia of drones, components and related technology. That European decision has its own scope and grounds.

The new US designations also have different legal foundations. The Treasury lists 27 newly designated airlines on the basis of operating in Iran’s aviation sector, within an overall package of 36 targets. Operating in that sector is the legal basis for those listings. Iran Airtour, the airline operating the cancelled service, appears in OFAC’s record under that sectoral authority.

The sectoral basis extends restrictions to commercial relationships and travellers who are not individually accused of wrongdoing. Assessing the policy will require examining its effects on both the targeted military activities and civilian travel.

Permissions also follow the aircraft

Replacing an Iranian carrier with a foreign one may seem an obvious alternative. But permissions attached to the aircraft itself can matter too.

The former General License J-1 allowed non-US persons, subject to conditions, to bring certain civil aircraft into Iran temporarily. It covered eligible US-origin aircraft and some foreign-made aircraft containing specified US-controlled content, with operational-control and registration requirements. The authorisation was suspended on September 8.

A foreign carrier must therefore check the aircraft’s status, its controlled content and the permissions required. The carrier’s nationality alone does not settle that question.

There is also a separate question: whether the flight is safe. EASA’s bulletin on Iranian airspace, revised on August 31 and valid until September 30 unless reviewed earlier, recommends that the operators within its scope avoid that airspace at all altitudes. It is safety guidance, not a universal flight ban issued by OFAC.

A cancellation may reflect a commercial prohibition, an authorisation problem, military risk or several factors together. An overall count of lost flights would not isolate the effect of the new sanctions.

The practical conditions for aircraft maintenance

The withdrawal of permissions also affects the conditions under which civil aircraft can be maintained. OFAC’s September 8 suspension notice includes the aircraft-safety licensing policy under section 560.528. A licensing policy is not the same as a general authorisation automatically permitting every spare-parts transaction.

The Treasury says it will consider aviation-safety requests individually. An application route therefore remains available, with a decision still required for the transaction concerned.

A repair then needs a supplier, an accepted payment and delivery of the part or service. Being able to submit an application leaves all those steps unresolved.

Assessing passenger protection would require the number of applications, processing times, decisions and actual deliveries. The sources reviewed do not provide those data for the September measures.

The passengers still looking for a route

The consequences are not limited to Iranian citizens. In its reporting from Najaf, AFP describes routes used for pilgrimage, education and medical care, including by Iraqis travelling to Iran. A restriction on an airline reaches its customers regardless of nationality.

A longer connection, an overland journey or postponement may become necessary. The human cost depends partly on how urgent the trip is. The sources reviewed provide no robust estimate of the extra cost of tickets or the number of patients stranded.

On September 24, AFP still reported services to China and Armenia and said Turkey remained open to Iranian travellers. That dated account rules out treating the announced worldwide shutdown as already complete. The current availability of a journey must be checked with its operators.

Diplomatic opposition, and the risk of a wider disruption

Beijing has publicly challenged the American approach. Asked about the restrictions on September 22, China’s foreign ministry spokesperson reiterated his government’s opposition to unilateral sanctions it considers unsupported by international law or a UN Security Council mandate. That is China’s position, not a judicial ruling. Nor does it guarantee how every Chinese bank or service provider will respond.

On the Iranian side, Reuters reported that a senior official threatened regional airports enforcing the US restrictions on September 23. The dispatch describes a public threat without reporting an attack carrying it out. Security tensions thus add a separate risk to the commercial constraints.

If suspensions persist while some destinations remain accessible, travel could concentrate on a narrower network. The effect on fares would depend on remaining demand, capacity and overland alternatives. No price forecast follows from that scenario here.

A partial reopening would require more than a political announcement: authorisations, ground services and payment arrangements would all need to work for the route concerned. A security incident, meanwhile, could trigger additional interruptions for reasons distinct from the sanctions. These are conditional scenarios, not forecasts with assigned probabilities.

A ticket depends on a chain of services

Travel options have already narrowed in the UAE and the Iraqi airports concerned. Baghdad’s exemption request now shows where a possible reopening would be negotiated: in the permissions and operating conditions for civilian routes.

The passenger’s ticket connects more than two cities. It requires an airport willing to receive the carrier, the necessary services and payments that can be completed. Washington applies pressure along that chain, reaching a journey that never crosses American territory.

The strategy’s military and political effectiveness remains to be measured. The suspensions already document obstacles to travel; securing concessions from Tehran or durably disrupting the targeted networks would be a further outcome to assess.

Sources

• AFP / Malay Mail, 2026-09-24. Iran Airtour cancellation and services still reported on September 24.
• GCAA / Emirates News Agency (WAM), 2026-09-24. UAE suspension of flights operated by Iranian airlines.
• Reuters / L’Orient Today, 2026-09-25. Suspensions at all four Iraqi airports serving Iran.
• AFP / Arab News, 2026-09-25. Najaf suspension and civilian uses of the routes.
• AFP / L’Orient Today, 2026-09-21. Bessent’s objective, as reported from his CNBC interview.
• US Treasury, 2026-09-08. New airline designations and foreign intermediaries.
• OFAC, 2026-09-08. OFAC designation entries and accompanying documents.
• OFAC, 2026-08-24. Aviation added to the sectoral sanctions framework.
• Federal Register, 2020-01-14; signed January 10, 2020. Executive Order 13902, sections 1 and 2.
• OFAC, 2024-08-21. FAQ 11: who and what falls within US sanctions rules.
• OFAC, 2020-06-05. FAQ 833: knowledge and significant goods or services.
• Bank for International Settlements, 2020-02-29. How correspondent banking works.
• OFAC, 2026-09-08. General License DD and its wind-down deadline.
• OFAC, 2026-09-08. Suspension of aviation permissions and licensing policy.
• OFAC, 2016-12-15; suspended September 8, 2026. Scope of the former General License J-1.
• FinCEN, 2026-09-08. FinCEN alert FIN-2026-Alert006 on Iranian aviation procurement.
• Council of the European Union, 2024-10-14. EU measures targeting Saha, Mahan and Iran Air in 2024.
• EASA, 2026-07-08; revised August 31, 2026. EASA bulletin CZIB-2026-04-R1 on Iranian airspace.
• Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2026-09-22. Chinese foreign ministry response on September 22.
• Reuters / Gulf Times, 2026-09-24. Flight interruptions and the reported Iranian airport threat.
• DGAC / DSAC, 2019-06-13. Ground handling and coordination of airport services.
• OFAC, 2020-12-07. FAQ 831: support to designated parties and foreign-bank exposure.
• AFP / Arab News, 2026-09-26. Iraq seeks an exemption for certain airports.

Method and limitations

Evidence reviewed through September 26, 2026. The latest development included is Iraq’s request for an exemption, reported on September 26. Official statements establish their authors’ decisions; they do not independently verify every allegation used to justify them. Reporting by AFP and Reuters is attributed where used. American rules are described within their scope, without treating secondary sanctions as a universal law.

No comprehensive audit of flight movements, bank refusals, fares or licence applications was conducted. The fuel supplier is hypothetical. The scenarios carry no numerical forecast or assigned probability. No interviews were conducted specifically for this article. Operating conditions may change quickly; this is neither a flight confirmation nor individual legal advice.