Hormuz reopens: three quantified scenarios for the…

On 14 June, Donald Trump announced on Truth Social that the deal with Iran was “complete” and authorised the “toll-free” reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, lifting the US naval blockade of Iranian ports. Tehran confirmed the next day, specifying that implementation would only begin at the formal signing, set for 19 June in Geneva. Markets reacted immediately: Brent lost 4.7% on 15 June to close at $83.17, its lowest level since 10 March, and WTI fell 4.8% to $80.75.

Except that, as I already noted in my April situation report, an announcement of reopening is not a reopening. And above all, the deal took the war premium out of prices, not the damage the war left behind. Understanding that gap is the whole point for anyone trying to anticipate what comes next.

What Hormuz was worth, and what the crisis destroyed

The strait is the world’s most critical oil artery after Malacca. In 2025, the IEA measures an average flow of 20 million barrels a day of crude and refined products through it, about 25% of world seaborne oil trade. The EIA puts the first quarter of 2025 at 20.1 million barrels a day, of which 14.2 crude, and estimates that this represents nearly a fifth of world oil consumption. On gas, the IEA recalls that about 19% of world LNG trade depends on Hormuz.

The war launched in late February almost shut off the tap. According to Britannica, after the conflict began and then the Iranian threats to attack vessels, more than 95% of traffic was rerouted. Analyses cited by the press speak of a roughly 95% fall in tanker transits and nearly 99% of LNG over the 107 days of blockage. It is, by the IEA’s own account, the largest disruption the oil market has ever suffered.

The problem is that there is no plan B on the scale needed. The London School of Economics, citing the IEA, recalls that the Saudi and Emirati pipelines that bypass Hormuz can only redirect 3.5 to 5.5 million barrels a day. On a base of 20 million, that leaves a net deficit of 14.5 to 16.5 million barrels a day in the event of a total closure. It is this figure that says how long strategic reserves can hold, and the answer is: not indefinitely.

The gap between $83 and $72

Here is the point most commentary misses. Brent at $83 is not Brent at $72. Before the 28 February strikes, the barrel was trading around $70-72. During the crisis, it peaked above $106 in April, on the successive hopes and relapses around the strait. The 14 June deal erased the acute conflict premium, but the market still prices a residual premium on the order of $8 to $15 tied to the logistical aftermath.

This gap is not irrational: it has physical causes. Traffic has not moved since the announcement, shipowners awaiting the 19 June signing and security guarantees, according to AIS data reported by Argus. The Pentagon warns that mine clearance can take up to six months, even if the memorandum sets a 30-day target. Hundreds of vessels are stuck in the Gulf and will have to exit, be inspected and repositioned. And some producers having shut wells for lack of storage, their restart is slow. To follow the barrel live rather than at the moment I write, our guide on reading the oil market sets out Brent and WTI.

Three normalisation scenarios

From there, one can build three trajectories. They are not predictions, but plausible bounds anchored on the estimates published by market analysts and institutions.

Central scenario: orderly normalisation. This is the trajectory that fits Kpler’s estimates, for which traffic could recover to nearly 50% of pre-war levels within 30 days of the deal, assuming no major incident. Kpler estimates at 118 the number of stranded tankers that could exit within 15 days. Frontline, which has five vessels stuck in the Gulf, judges that “vessels will move very quickly once the deal is signed”. In that case, Brent gradually converges toward the $78-85 zone by the end of summer. This is consistent with Goldman Sachs, which raised its Brent forecast to $85, and with Fitch, which pencils in a 2026 average of $87.

High scenario: slow reopening. If mine clearance drags toward the high end of the six months mentioned by the Pentagon, if shipowners demand persistent risk premiums and if the marine insurance premium stays high, logistical congestion keeps a high price floor. This is the scenario the EIA implicitly assumes, whose June Short-Term Energy Outlook projects a 2026 average of $95, on slower-reopening assumptions. In this configuration, the barrel stays stuck above $90 for a good part of the second half, with the known consequences for imported inflation, a subject I developed in the great US inflation comeback. The coming CPI releases and the FOMC meetings that will arbitrate this energy shock are worth watching on the economic calendar.

Low scenario: return to the floor. If the 19th signing holds, if mine clearance goes fast and if OPEC+ reopens the valves of shut wells, the residual premium dissipates and Brent returns toward $72-75, its level before the strikes. This is the least likely scenario in the short term, because it assumes all the frictions resolve simultaneously, but it is the long-term anchor once the logistics are purged.

The variables that can break everything

Three threads can unravel the ball. First the mines: as long as they are there, captains bide their time, and Bimco maintains a high-risk advisory on the strait. Next the ambiguity of the deal itself: Iran speaks of a toll-free transit limited to 60 days, after which Tehran and Oman would administer the strait, while Vice President Vance asserts that the US expectation is durable free passage. This divergence of interpretation is exactly the kind of vagueness that derailed the April ceasefire, as I analysed in the Hormuz tolls and the USDT-Tron rail. Finally the Lebanese variable: Israeli operations in Lebanon continue independently of the US-Iran framework, and it was a strike in Lebanon that suspended access to the strait in April. Nothing in the current memorandum resolves this point.

What stands out

The 14 June deal is good macro news, but the market is right not to cry victory. The war premium is out, the congestion is not. My working scenario remains the central one: convergence toward $78-85 by the end of summer if the signing holds and if mine clearance respects the 30-day window, with an asymmetric risk to the upside as long as the mines and the toll ambiguity persist. For the full geopolitical context of this crisis, my deep piece on the 2026 Iran war keeps all its relevance.

The strait reopens. The market, for its part, still takes weeks to clear a four-month jam.

Sources: EIA (World Oil Transit Chokepoints), IEA (Strait of Hormuz factsheet 2025), London School of Economics Business Review, Kpler, Goldman Sachs, Fitch, EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook of June, Argus Media, CNBC, Reuters, NBC News, Britannica. Price levels as of 15 June 2026. This is not investment advice.