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The fragile benchmark behind America’s bank sales

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dated revision: November 16, 2026primary sourcesno tracker
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When selling a failed bank, the FDIC compares bids with the cost of liquidation. Its inspector general finds incomplete data, insufficiently supported assumptions and late explanations in the 2023 resolutions. Those weaknesses affect the benchmark used to decide whether a sale offers good value. S01 S02

Investigation as of 16 November 2026. Monetary amounts are in nominal US dollars unless stated otherwise.

On 1 May 2023, First Republic moved under JPMorgan Chase. Customers were meant to keep using their bank through the transition. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation presented the deal as the least costly outcome for its insurance fund. A memorandum explaining the choice of loss assumptions was created on 14 December: 227 days after the takeover. That interval concerns the formalisation of the reasoning in this particular document. S01, pp. 31–32; S04

Report EVAL-27-02 from the Office of Inspector General (OIG), dated 10 November 2026 and announced on 13 November, examines the valuations of Silicon Valley Bank, Signature and First Republic in spring 2023. The findings weaken confidence in the liquidation estimates used to assess bids. Crucial rates and amounts remain redacted in the public version. The report lets readers follow decisions and shortcomings in their supporting records, with a specific limit on the financial verdict: recalculating an avoidable loss would require those data and a feasible alternative available at the same time. S01, pp. 1, 13–25 and 35–37; S02

Liquidation sets the benchmark for evaluating a bid

A bank can run out of liquidity before losing all its economic value. Deposit flight forces it to find funding or a buyer very quickly, as in the US regional-bank crisis. The distinction between liquidity and solvency, explained in our guide to reading a bank’s soundness, becomes critical to preserving services and realising asset value.

In a resolution, the FDIC values loans and other assets, the deposits to be assumed and the expenses it would incur if it liquidated the bank. The least-cost test compares that option with acceptable bids. The law focuses on total cost to the Deposit Insurance Fund, or DIF. Future and contingent obligations enter the comparison. S01, pp. 2–6; S03, § 1823(c)(4)(A)

Cash flows must be discounted: a payment several years away is translated into a comparable value at the reference date. The statute requires realistic discount rates, documented assumptions and retention of supporting records for at least five years. It also specifies dates for determining assistance and liquidation costs. A headline sale price therefore captures only part of a transaction that may include financing or guarantees. S03, § 1823(c)(4)(B)–(D)

The three cases have different legal frameworks. First Republic remained subject to the ordinary least-cost requirement. For SVB and Signature, the systemic risk exception invoked on 12 March 2023 allowed all depositors to be protected and permitted departure from that statutory constraint. The FDIC nevertheless used its comparison model to assess best value in the sales. S01, pp. 4 and 9–10; S05 S08

Liquidation and transfer: discounted costsSchematic without monetary amounts comparing discounted net costs to the insurance fund for the 2023 resolutions. Price, recoveries, expenses and retained risks enter the comparison. Legal frameworks differ for First Republic and SVB/Signature.Liquidation and transfer: discounted costsDiscounted net costs · 2023 resolutionsFailed bankRetain and liquidateTransfer to an acquirerRecoveries and expensesPrice and retained risksLiquidation net costTransfer net costCompare total costs to the DIF
Compare liquidation and transferSchematic without monetary amounts comparing discounted net costs to the insurance fund for the 2023 resolutions. Price, recoveries, expenses and retained risks enter the comparison. Legal frameworks differ for First Republic and SVB/Signature.Compare liquidation and transferDiscounted net costs · 2023 resolutionsFailed bankLiquidateTransferRecoveriesExpensesAcquisition priceRetained risksDiscountednet costDiscountednet costCompare total costs to the DIF
FIG. 01 The comparison uses discounted net costs, including price, recoveries, expenses and retained risks. First Republic was subject to the least-cost requirement. SVB and Signature operated under the systemic-risk exception, within a different legal framework. [S01][S03][S08]

Assumptions can change the preference between selling and liquidating. If assets retained by the FDIC are expected to recover less, liquidation costs rise. They also rise when anticipated expenses increase. An unchanged bid can then cross the comparison threshold. Ranking competing bids against one another depends on their respective assets, liabilities and commitments. S01, pp. 35–36

Take an entirely hypothetical example, in billions of dollars already stated in present-value terms. A fund must repay 100 of insured deposits. With 96 recovered from assets and 4 of expenses, liquidation costs 100 − 96 + 4 = 8. A sale costing 12 would be more expensive. With recoveries of 90 and expenses of 6, liquidation costs 16: the unchanged sale at 12 becomes preferable. The example isolates this mechanism, setting aside other creditors and guarantees.

Incomplete data make the choice of assumptions more consequential

The first difficulties come before the calculation. Detailed asset information must be reconciled with the general ledger, the bank’s central accounting record. FDIC officials said they had only one day’s notice before SVB closed. Its ledger was incomplete and unreliable. Accountants then needed weeks to understand what the accounts represented at failure. At Signature, data from some loan servicers arrived too late for the usual pre-closing reconciliation. S01, pp. 13–14

The agency worked with models, internal specialists and outside advisers. The OIG found that full asset valuation reviews expected for SVB and Signature had not been obtained. The FDIC used what it called blended loss rates, selected from several approaches for individual portfolios. The report makes clear that these were selections, without a weighted average or statistical method. Explaining those choices therefore became particularly important. S01, pp. 16–21 and p. 30, footnote 76

For SVB, the FDIC used bid information on Signature portfolios to revise its estimates after SVB’s bidding had closed. For Signature, it also increased estimated losses after receiving bids. Weak bids can provide information about a disrupted market and prompt correction of an optimistic assumption. The control question is whether the new information, the reason for the change and its approval are preserved. The OIG identifies inadequate justification for some revisions. S01, pp. 17–21 and 29–31

The expense model created another weakness. The Receivership Expense Model, or REM, was poorly suited to large, complex banks, according to the inspector general. It may have overstated expenses and made liquidation appear more costly in the comparison. FDIC officials described it as the best tool available at the time. Its technical documentation nevertheless allowed expert judgement to replace model output in certain circumstances. The FDIC has since developed a new model, REEM, designed to produce more reliable estimates. S01, pp. 35–36

First Republic: 57 files received out of 355 selected

First Republic provides a particularly instructive number. The valuation contractor selected 355 loans for review, but received only 57 loan files to derive its estimates. The report links the shortfall to the compressed timetable. The initial selection methodology prioritised the three largest loans by balance in each sub-asset category. S01, p. 23, footnote 55

The calculation 57 / 355 × 100 gives 16.1% after rounding. Its denominator is the contractor’s requested selection. Assessing economic coverage would also require the balances and distribution of the files received. A small number of large loans can represent substantial money, with different risks from smaller credits.

First Republic: 57 of 355 files receivedNovember 2026 OIG review: 57 of 355 selected First Republic files were received, or 16.1%. The other 298 were not received within this non-random selection. Each square is one file, without weighting by loan balance.First Republic: 57 of 355 files receivedNovember 2026 OIG review · First Republic files57 receivedof 355 selected16.1%of selected filesReceivedSelected, not receivedOne square = one selected fileTargeted selection: three largest loans in each subcategory
First Republic: files receivedNovember 2026 OIG review: 57 of 355 selected First Republic files were received, or 16.1%. The other 298 were not received within this non-random selection. Each square is one file, without weighting by loan balance.First Republic: files receivedNovember 2026 OIG review · First Republic files57 of 355 received16.1%Files selected for valuation reviewReceivedNot receivedOne square = one fileTargeted: the three largest loansin each subcategory
FIG. 02 The First Republic review received 57 of 355 selected files (16.1%). The non-random selection targeted the three largest loans in each subcategory. Each square counts one file, with equal weight regardless of its loan balance. [S01]

Standard procedures directed analysts towards the midpoint of the contractor’s loss range. The FDIC chose a high-loss scenario for First Republic. Its explanation included banking-system stress, exceptional expenses associated with borrowing lines and the volume of assets it might have had to manage across several receiverships. The incomplete sample also complicated customary reliance on the midpoint. S01, pp. 22–23

The inspector general explicitly acknowledges that the high-loss scenario may have been appropriate. Its criticism concerns departure from established practices and the quality of the supporting evidence. The December memorandum contained inaccurate information and relied on an outdated version of the asset valuation review, according to the OIG. Urgency may warrant a cautious judgement while still requiring a sound record of its basis. S01, pp. 24 and 31–32

The memoranda follow the takeovers

For Signature, the OIG records a takeover on 20 March 2023 and a memorandum finalised on 27 March, seven days later. The agreement had been announced on 19 March. These dates concern different milestones: agreement, transfer of the business and finalisation of the document. For First Republic, 1 May to 14 December is an interval of 227 calendar days. The memoranda examined reveal the retained documentary record of the decisions. S01, pp. 31–32; S10 S11

Memos formalised after the transactionsCalendar days in 2023: Signature operational transfer on 20 March, memo finalised on 27 March, seven days. First Republic sale on 1 May, memo created on 14 December, 227 days. These are memo formalisation intervals, distinct from the start of analysis.Memos formalised after the transactionsCalendar days · 2023 dates060120180240SignatureMemo finalised20 → 27 March 20237 dFirst RepublicMemo created1 May → 14 Dec 2023227 ddays · common scaleTwo documentary milestones: finalisation and creation
Memos after the transactionsCalendar days in 2023: Signature operational transfer on 20 March, memo finalised on 27 March, seven days. First Republic sale on 1 May, memo created on 14 December, 227 days. These are memo formalisation intervals, distinct from the start of analysis.Memos after the transactionsCalendar days · 2023 datesSignature7 days20 → 27 March 2023 · finalisationFirst Republic227 days1 May → 14 Dec 2023 · creation060120180240days · common scaleMemo finalisation or creation
FIG. 03 The two 2023 intervals run from operational transfer to Signature’s finalised memo and First Republic’s newly created memo, respectively 7 and 227 calendar days. They track documentary formalisation, distinct from when the valuation work began. [S01]

Retention of final versions also fell short. Signature’s final least-cost analysis was absent from both official repositories examined. A version retained by one division preceded revisions by the other. The OIG identifies inconsistency with the agency’s internal requirements and difficulty for its board, auditors and Congress in reconstructing the decision. S01, pp. 32–33, footnote 80

Initial DIF cost estimates show the scale of the transactions: $20 billion for SVB, $2.5 billion for Signature and $13 billion for First Republic in 2023. They describe the expected costs of the failures at the time, after losses and deposit flight. Measuring a loss caused by valuation weaknesses would require comparison with a credible alternative, available on the same date and covering the same commitments. S01, pp. 8–9; S04 S12

Signet required a valuation of its own

Signet allowed real-time payments between Signature’s commercial customers. During a November 2022 readiness exercise, the FDIC had already identified potential franchise value and the need to examine whether the activity could be separated. During resolution, Signet remained within a general “other assets” category, without a separate valuation. S01, pp. 14–16

The platform was difficult to isolate in the accounts. Officials interviewed by the OIG had not discussed its accounting treatment with Signature’s management. The inspector general consequently left its book value and estimated liquidation loss undetermined. A payment technology may derive value from customers, contracts and service continuity beyond its accounting treatment. This connects with the distinctions between charters, deposits and services examined in our investigation of crypto and the meaning of bank. S01, pp. 15–16

Official testimony reports $152,000 for marketed trademarks and preferred stock associated with Signet. The master servicing contract received no bids and was subsequently repudiated by the FDIC. The amount describes the elements sold. The value of the whole business before failure, and how much different preparation could have preserved, remain open questions. S09, p. 8

Financing and guarantees keep producing effects after a sale

JPMorgan announced $50 billion in five-year, fixed-rate FDIC financing for First Republic, alongside loss-sharing agreements on certain loans. The financing is repayable. The agreements allocate future risks between the buyer and the FDIC. Their economic cost depends on financial terms, repayments and losses actually covered. S06 S04

The buyer also expected an initial post-tax gain of approximately $2.6 billion, excluding anticipated $2 billion in post-tax restructuring costs. Those expectations date from 1 May 2023. The loan, expected accounting gain and initial DIF cost estimate measure different things, to be assessed alongside the detailed commitments when judging the transaction’s terms. S06

For SVB and Signature, exceptional protection of uninsured deposits is to be funded through a special assessment on banks. Shareholders and certain unsecured creditors remained outside that protection. The law provides for recovery of the relevant losses; the FDIC later adjusted collection arrangements in a December 2025 decision. How the burden ultimately falls also depends on the pricing and other choices of the banks that pay it. S03, § 1823(c)(4)(G); S05 S16

Speed could preserve considerable value by limiting contagion. The GAO concluded in its January 2025 review that the measures likely helped stabilise the system. Several interventions, including the Federal Reserve’s BTFP emergency lending, operated together. The absence of an observable path without intervention prevents the effect of the systemic risk exception from being isolated. Stabilisation benefits and the quality of individual valuations therefore need to be assessed at their respective levels. S08

The next decision must remain verifiable after the emergency

The FDIC accepts all five recommendations. At the report’s issuance, action on valuation contracts had been completed and that recommendation was closed. The other four remained open. The new contractual framework provides for expedited valuations deliverable in as little as three calendar days, with scope defined at engagement. Remaining work concerns specialised assets, indicative bids, documentation and shared records. The latest announced deadline is 30 September 2027. S01, pp. 37 and 44–46

An earlier OIG report, published on 10 December 2024, had already described insufficiently mature readiness for large regional bank failures. In June 2026, the FDIC presented new resolution-readiness proposals. The Comptroller of the Currency argued for strengthening the agency’s own capabilities. In the regulatory publications consulted as of 16 November, the June texts remained classified as proposals. S07 S13 S14

The operational test begins with the files: obtaining usable data, reconciling them with the accounts and being able to explain an assumption changed over a weekend. The bank-franchise marketing evaluation, still listed as ongoing work as of 13 November, will need to be read alongside this report. S15 A price decided under emergency pressure becomes defensible when its assumptions, successive versions and alternatives remain open to scrutiny after the panic passes. S01, pp. 1 and 33–37

Sources

Documents consulted on 16 November 2026. Key pages of the public OIG report and the Signet testimony were visually inspected. Page references below follow the printed pagination.

  1. S01 · FDIC Office of Inspector General · Published : 2026-11-10 · Accessed : 2026-11-16FDIC’s Valuation Process for Large Regional Bank Resolutions, EVAL-27-02
    Passages and scope

    Report dated 10 November 2026, assessing March–May 2023 activities. Official PDF downloaded and key pages visually inspected. Pp. 13–21: reconciliation, incomplete reviews, selected rates and changes after bids. P. 23, footnote 55: 355 loans selected, 57 files received, initial selection of the three largest per sub-category. P. 24: First Republic’s high-loss scenario may have been appropriate. Pp. 31–32: Signature and First Republic memoranda, the latter created on 14 December 2023 using an outdated AVR. Pp. 35–36: REM limitations and completed REEM development. Pp. 44 and 46: expedited valuations, recommendation 2 closed and four open. The loss-rate table on p. 30 and expense table on p. 36 remain redacted. The OIG establishes procedural weaknesses and risks without quantifying avoidable damage.

  2. S02 · FDIC Office of Inspector General · Published : 2026-11-13 · Accessed : 2026-11-16OIG announcement of the valuation report
    Passages and scope

    Official announcement of 13 November 2026, full text consulted. It summarises the report dated 10 November, the categories of weakness, five accepted recommendations and the latest announced deadline of 30 September 2027. A communication about the same evaluation, separate from external confirmation.

  3. S03 · Office of the Law Revision Counsel, U.S. House of Representatives · Published : unspecified; current text consulted · Accessed : 2026-11-16Official U.S. Code: 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)
    Passages and scope

    Full official text consulted. § 1823(c)(4)(A): total cost, future and contingent obligations. (B): discounting, realistic assumptions, documentation and retention for at least five years. (C): cost-determination dates for assistance and liquidation. (D): insured deposits less the present value of net recoveries. (G): systemic exception decided by Treasury following two-thirds recommendations from the FDIC and Federal Reserve boards, in consultation with the president, and special recovery of losses attributable to protection of uninsured deposits.

  4. S04 · Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation · Published : 2023-05-01 · Accessed : 2026-11-16FDIC: JPMorgan Chase assumes First Republic deposits and assets
    Passages and scope

    1 May 2023 release distributed through the FDIC’s official GovDelivery service. Full text consulted: JPMorgan assumes deposits and substantially all First Republic assets, loss-sharing agreements and an initial $13 billion DIF cost estimate. The least-cost characterisation is the FDIC’s position at that date.

  5. S05 · Federal Reserve, Treasury, FDIC · Published : 2023-03-12 · Accessed : 2026-11-16Joint Treasury, Federal Reserve and FDIC statement on SVB and Signature
    Passages and scope

    Joint statement of 12 March 2023, 6:15 p.m. EDT. Full text consulted: protection of SVB and Signature depositors, exclusion of shareholders and certain unsecured creditors, and recovery of losses linked to uninsured deposits through a special assessment on banks. Separate from First Republic’s framework.

  6. S06 · JPMorgan Chase & Co. · Published : 2023-05-01 · Accessed : 2026-11-16JPMorgan Chase: announced terms of the First Republic acquisition
    Passages and scope

    1 May 2023 release, full text consulted. Announced terms include $50 billion of five-year, fixed-rate FDIC financing and loss-sharing agreements. Expected initial post-tax gain of $2.6 billion, excluding expected post-tax restructuring costs of $2 billion. Buyer expectations at the transaction date, separate from final results or a measurement of the financing’s net benefit.

  7. S07 · FDIC Office of Inspector General · Published : 2024-12-10 · Accessed : 2026-11-16FDIC Readiness to Resolve Large Regional Banks, EVAL-25-02
    Passages and scope

    Full report dated 10 December 2024 consulted. Its 2025-04 file directory reflects hosting. Findings concern readiness, resources, coordination and exercises before the 2023 failures. Recommendations are read at the report’s issuance and do not provide a count of actions still open today.

  8. S08 · Government Accountability Office · Published : 2025-01-23 · Accessed : 2026-11-16GAO: systemic risk and the response to the March 2023 failures
    Passages and scope

    GAO-25-107023, published on 23 January 2025. Full HTML version consulted. Sections cover the least-cost rule, systemic risk exception and effects of the response: likely stabilisation benefits, concurrent interventions including BTFP, absence of an observable counterfactual and moral-hazard risks. It examines the systemic response rather than the optimal price of each transaction.

  9. S09 · FDIC / U.S. House Committee on Financial Services · Published : 2023-11-15 · Accessed : 2026-11-16Martin Gruenberg’s congressional testimony, 15 November 2023
    Passages and scope

    Official testimony PDF dated 15 November 2023, with cover and p. 8 visually inspected. It reports $152,000 from marketed trademarks and preferred stock, no bids for the master servicing contract and its subsequent repudiation. The scope is those elements. Documentary discrepancy: the 2026 OIG report places Signet-related sales in 2024 (p. 16), while this November 2023 testimony already reports the same amount. The dating difference remains unresolved; no sale year is used in the article’s body.

  10. S10 · Office of the Comptroller of the Currency · Published : 2023-03-20 · Accessed : 2026-11-16OCC: conditional approval of Flagstar’s partial Signature acquisition
    Passages and scope

    20 March 2023 communication, full text consulted. OCC conditional approval of Flagstar’s purchase of certain Signature Bridge Bank assets and deposits. It establishes a supervisory decision. The effective takeover date is checked against the transaction documents in S11 and the OIG report.

  11. S11 · New York Community Bancorp ; dépôt SEC EDGAR · Published : 2023-03-20 · Accessed : 2026-11-16NYCB: assets and liabilities acquired from Signature Bridge Bank
    Passages and scope

    Buyer release attached to a SEC filing, 20 March 2023: scope of acquired assets and liabilities, excluding certain digital-asset and fund-banking activities. Full text consulted. A subsequent amended filing confirms an effective takeover on 20 March. The documents establish transaction scope, separate from conclusions about regulatory motives.

    Amended filing: effective takeover date.

    FDIC: Signature agreement announced on 19 March 2023.

  12. S12 · Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation · Published : 2023-03-26 · Accessed : 2026-11-16FDIC: First Citizens assumes Silicon Valley Bridge Bank deposits and loans
    Passages and scope

    FDIC release dated 26 March 2023, in the official GovDelivery bulletin sent on 27 March at 12:52 a.m. EDT. Full text consulted: First Citizens assumes Silicon Valley Bridge Bank operations, branches reopen on 27 March and initial DIF cost is estimated at $20 billion. Release date remains separate from distribution and transfer dates.

  13. S13 · Office of the Comptroller of the Currency · Published : 2026-06-25 · Accessed : 2026-11-16OCC: Comptroller’s position on resolution-readiness proposals
    Passages and scope

    Comptroller statement of 25 June 2026, full text consulted. Public policy position favouring stronger FDIC execution capabilities and fewer hypothetical documents required from banks. It accompanies rulemaking proposals presented that day.

  14. S14 · Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation · Published : 2026-06-25 · Accessed : 2026-11-16FDIC: 25 June board meeting and rulemaking proposals
    Passages and scope

    Full official account of the 25 June 2026 meeting consulted. Texts 2026-13191 and 2026-13192 were published in the Federal Register on 30 June, with comments due on 31 August. The official annual index consulted as of 16 November lists them under Proposed Rules, with no corresponding final rule identified in that index. Links below allow the proposals and their documentary status to be followed.

    Proposal 2026-13191.

    Proposal 2026-13192.

    FDIC 2026 index and status as of 16 November.

  15. S15 · FDIC Office of Inspector General · Published : 2026-11-10 · Accessed : 2026-11-16OIG catalogue and recommendations for EVAL-27-02
    Passages and scope

    Catalogue read in full on 16 November 2026: publication on 10 November, report EVAL-27-02 and five items under Unimplemented Recommendations. The public report states on pp. 37 and 46 that one action was complete, recommendation 2 was closed and the other four remained open. The documents reviewed do not explain the discrepancy. The article follows the report’s detailed status at issuance.

    The official ongoing-work list, dated 13 November 2026 and consulted on 16 November, still includes FDIC’s Franchise Marketing Process for Large Regional Bank Resolutions.

    OIG ongoing work, status as of 13 November 2026.

  16. S16 · Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation · Published : 2025-12-19 · Accessed : 2026-11-16Federal Register: amendment of special-assessment collection
    Passages and scope

    Interim final rule decided on 16 December 2025, published and effective on 19 December. Full official text consulted, § III.A, p. 59370: estimated $16.7 billion as of 30 September 2025 for losses attributable to protecting uninsured SVB and Signature deposits within the special-assessment scope. This dated, specific amount is kept separate from the initial total-cost estimates for the three failures.

Limits

Redactions in the public report prevent reconstruction of loss rates, decisive portfolio values and estimated expenses. The findings concern procedures, data and supporting records, with identified financial risks. The sensitivity example is hypothetical and simplified. Initial costs announced in 2023 remain dated estimates, separate from final costs or damage attributable to the weaknesses. The seven-day and 227-day intervals date the documents examined, rather than the start of all analytical work. Discrepancies between the catalogue and report on recommendation status, and between the OIG report and testimony on the year of Signet-related sales, are set out in S15 and S09.

This analysis is not investment advice.

// cite this analysis

l0g, “The fragile benchmark behind America’s bank sales”, l0g.fr, published November 16, 2026, updated November 16, 2026, https://l0g.fr/en/analysis/fdic-valorisations-faillites-banques-2023/


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