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The ECB’s €4.4 billion reserve question

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Illustration for the analysis: The ECB’s €4.4 billion reserve question
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dated revision: November 19, 2026primary sourcesno tracker
Contents7 sections

The ECB could cut the Eurosystem’s interest bill to banks by €4.4 billion a year, at a fixed rate and reserve base. Raising the minimum reserve ratio from 1% to 2% would leave more of the money banks hold at their central banks earning zero. The initial loss of income can be calculated. Who ultimately bears it depends on how banks change their prices and how customers respond. S08 · S09 · S06 · S03

On 18 November, Reuters reported, citing four sources, that an increase in the minimum reserve ratio from 1% to 2% would be discussed on 25 November. As of 19 November 2026, the official rules reviewed for this article still specify 1%. The ECB calendar lists a non-monetary-policy meeting on the 25th without a detailed agenda. Reuters says a decision could come on 17 December. S01 · S02 · S26

To understand the idea, start with the bond purchases made during the years of low interest rates. They left central banks holding long-dated securities and commercial banks holding central bank money. The interest earned and paid on those two sides of the balance sheet now moves at different speeds. S12 · S14

The legacy of bond purchases

When a central bank buys a bond from a bank, it pays by crediting that bank’s account. The commercial bank swaps a security for reserves: balances in central bank money, used among other things to settle payments between banks. The Eurosystem records a bond as an asset and reserves as a liability. A purchase from a non-bank investor is settled through the investor’s bank and also creates a deposit for the investor. S12 · S13

Those reserves can circulate. When a customer pays a supplier who uses another bank, a deposit moves across banks and reserves are transferred to settle the payment. This changes the distribution of reserves across the banking system. Their aggregate volume depends on central bank operations and other flows, including demand for banknotes and changes in government deposits. S12 · S07

Asset purchases therefore created a lasting financial relationship between banks and the Eurosystem. If the bonds earn little while interest on reserves rises, central bank earnings come under pressure. A fixed-rate bond pays its contractual coupon. The cost of reserves can change with each rate decision. S14 · S16

This exposure has already shown up in the accounts. The ECB itself, a legal entity separate from the national central banks, reported a €1.254 billion loss in 2025, compared with €7.944 billion in 2024. Lower net interest expense explains much of the improvement. Both figures are historical annual results for that particular institution. The proposed saving on bank reserves concerns the wider central banking system of the euro area. S15

A requirement linked to banks’ funding

The minimum is calculated from particular bank liabilities, including deposits and short-term debt securities that fall within the reserve base. Some liabilities are excluded, notably those to other institutions subject to the requirement and not exempt from it. Others carry a zero ratio, including repos, deposits with maturities or notice periods exceeding two years, and debt securities with original maturities exceeding two years. The 1% ratio applies to this defined regulatory base. S03

A bank then deducts a €100,000 allowance from its requirement, subject to special rules for groups. Compliance is assessed using average holdings over a maintenance period. Daily balances can fluctuate as payments arrive and leave: higher holdings on one day can offset lower holdings on another. This flexibility helps banks manage money market liquidity. S03 · S26

Required reserves have earned zero since 20 September 2023. Other holdings are treated differently. For eligible counterparties, excess balances in reserve accounts and funds placed in the deposit facility earn the deposit facility rate. That rate has been 2.50% since 16 September 2026. The ECB left it unchanged on 29 October. S04 · S27 · S06 · S28

A recent rule change matters here. The alignment of remuneration on excess reserve-account balances took effect on 17 June 2026. Some older explanatory pages still describe the previous arrangements. Under the current rules, moving funds between the reserve account and the deposit facility preserves their remuneration, provided the bank meets the access conditions and the funds remain above its reserve requirement. S05 · S27

A move to 2% would shift that dividing line. Some balances that currently earn interest would become required reserves earning zero. The central bank’s saving would arise at the same point as the commercial bank’s loss of interest income. S03 · S04 · S27

Reconstructing the €4.4 billion

The latest daily snapshot available during the research is for 18 November. The ECB reports €177.314 billion of required reserves for the maintenance period running from 4 November to 22 December, €334.644 billion in current accounts and €1,929.436 billion in the deposit facility. Those last two items add up to €2,264.080 billion of banks’ balances with the Eurosystem. S07

To calculate the additional requirement, the most useful starting point is the reserve base itself. The ECB assigns September 2026 liability data to this maintenance period: about €17,762.1 billion of deposits and debt securities subject to the positive ratio. One percentage point of that base is approximately €177.6 billion. At 2.50%, the simple annualised interest amounts to €4.44 billion, assuming the balances move from the deposit rate to zero and both the base and the rate remain constant. S08 · S09 · S06

A change in remuneration, with balances fixed At fixed total balances of 2,264.080 billion euros, the 2 percent ratio scenario raises required reserves from 177.314 to 354.935 billion. About 177.6 billion would become unremunerated. Balances above the requirement are gross balances, distinct from official excess liquidity net of marginal lending. {"stock_date": "2026-11-18", "base_period": "2026-09", "maintenance_period": "2026-11-04/2026-12-22", "base_observation_comment": "MP202607", "required_reserves_status": "provisional", "current_ratio_percent": 1, "scenario_ratio_percent": 2, "rate_effective_date": "2026-09-16", "rate_confirmation_date": "2026-10-29", "base_eur_billion": "17762.06925346491", "extra_before_institution_threshold_effects_eur_billion": "177.6206925346491", "total_current_accounts_plus_deposit_facility_eur_billion": "2264.080", "sources": {"liquidity": "https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/liq/html/index.en.html", "daily_csv": "https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/pdf/monetary/lm/liq_daily_2026.zip", "deposits": "https://data.ecb.europa.eu/data/datasets/BSI/BSI.M.U2.N.R.L2B.L.1.A1.3000.Z01.E", "debt": "https://data.ecb.europa.eu/data/datasets/BSI/BSI.M.U2.N.R.L40.L.1.A1.3000.Z01.E", "rate": "https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2026/html/ecb.mp261029~9a493adf17.en.html"}, "assumptions": "Fixed eligible base, fixed total bank balances, and additional requirement funded from eligible remunerated balances. Institution-level allowance threshold effects not modelled. Simple annualisation = principal times annual rate, equivalent to360days under actual/360. No rate forecast or adopted2percent ratio asserted."} A change in remuneration, with balances fixed Euro area · 18 November 2026 · €bn Ratio 1% in force 177.3 required 2,086.8 above ≈177.6 €bn would shift to 0% Ratio 2% scenario ≈354.9 required ≈1,909.1 above Unchanged total: 2,264.1 €bn
A change in remuneration, with balances fixed At fixed total balances of 2,264.080 billion euros, the 2 percent ratio scenario raises required reserves from 177.314 to 354.935 billion. About 177.6 billion would become unremunerated. Balances above the requirement are gross balances, distinct from official excess liquidity net of marginal lending. {"stock_date": "2026-11-18", "base_period": "2026-09", "maintenance_period": "2026-11-04/2026-12-22", "base_observation_comment": "MP202607", "required_reserves_status": "provisional", "current_ratio_percent": 1, "scenario_ratio_percent": 2, "rate_effective_date": "2026-09-16", "rate_confirmation_date": "2026-10-29", "base_eur_billion": "17762.06925346491", "extra_before_institution_threshold_effects_eur_billion": "177.6206925346491", "total_current_accounts_plus_deposit_facility_eur_billion": "2264.080", "sources": {"liquidity": "https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/liq/html/index.en.html", "daily_csv": "https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/pdf/monetary/lm/liq_daily_2026.zip", "deposits": "https://data.ecb.europa.eu/data/datasets/BSI/BSI.M.U2.N.R.L2B.L.1.A1.3000.Z01.E", "debt": "https://data.ecb.europa.eu/data/datasets/BSI/BSI.M.U2.N.R.L40.L.1.A1.3000.Z01.E", "rate": "https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2026/html/ecb.mp261029~9a493adf17.en.html"}, "assumptions": "Fixed eligible base, fixed total bank balances, and additional requirement funded from eligible remunerated balances. Institution-level allowance threshold effects not modelled. Simple annualisation = principal times annual rate, equivalent to360days under actual/360. No rate forecast or adopted2percent ratio asserted."} A change in remuneration Fixed balances · 18 Nov 2026 · €bn 1% ratio in force 177.3 required 2,086.8 above ≈177.6 €bn would shift to 0% 2% ratio · scenario ≈354.9 required ≈1,909.1 above Total: 2,264.1 €bn
FIG. 01Under the 2% ratio scenario, about €177.6 billion would become unremunerated while total bank balances stay fixed. The ratio in force remains 1%.Sources: ECB, liquidity on 18 November 2026 · published reserve base for the period · CSV data and calculations.The bars combine current accounts and the deposit facility. Required reserves are provisional for 4 November to 22 December 2026. Balances above the requirement are gross of marginal lending. The scenario holds the base fixed and assumes the additional requirement comes from eligible remunerated balances, before institution-level allowance threshold effects.

A small calculation trap needs attention. Doubling the current net requirement overlooks the €100,000 allowance, which would be deducted once under each ratio. The additional amount depends on the gross base. Very small institutions require separate treatment because of the allowance thresholds and aggregation rules. Our estimate retains that qualification, along with the provisional status of the published requirement for the current period. S08 · S09 · S10 · S03

With balance sheets otherwise unchanged, total holdings at the Eurosystem would remain the same. A bank could move some money from the deposit facility into its reserve account to meet the higher requirement. The ECB’s measure of excess liquidity subtracts the required amount and use of the marginal lending facility from current-account and deposit-facility balances. If the minimum rises, the published figure can fall while those holdings stay the same. S07 · S25 · S03

Annualisation also needs a definition. The €4.44 billion figure is simply the balance multiplied by the annual interest rate. The deposit facility uses an actual/360 day-count convention: for an unchanged placement lasting 365 days, the corresponding amount would be about €4.50 billion. The eventual implementation date, interest rate and reserve base would determine the income actually forgone. S08 · S09 · S11

Holding the base constant, simple annualisation produces a saving of about €3.55 billion at a 2% rate and €5.33 billion at 3%. These are sensitivity scenarios. The chart uses the same simple convention throughout to isolate the effect of the rate. S08 · S09 · S06

The deposit rate changes the interest shift Arithmetic sensitivity using simple annualisation of about 177.6 billion euros reclassified to 0%. Rates of 1,2,3 and 4 percent are hypothetical. The only rate in force on 19 November 2026 is 2.50 percent, effective since 16 September and maintained on 29 October. The base and balances are fixed. {"stock_date": "2026-11-18", "base_period": "2026-09", "maintenance_period": "2026-11-04/2026-12-22", "base_observation_comment": "MP202607", "required_reserves_status": "provisional", "current_ratio_percent": 1, "scenario_ratio_percent": 2, "rate_effective_date": "2026-09-16", "rate_confirmation_date": "2026-10-29", "base_eur_billion": "17762.06925346491", "extra_before_institution_threshold_effects_eur_billion": "177.6206925346491", "total_current_accounts_plus_deposit_facility_eur_billion": "2264.080", "sources": {"liquidity": "https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/liq/html/index.en.html", "daily_csv": "https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/pdf/monetary/lm/liq_daily_2026.zip", "deposits": "https://data.ecb.europa.eu/data/datasets/BSI/BSI.M.U2.N.R.L2B.L.1.A1.3000.Z01.E", "debt": "https://data.ecb.europa.eu/data/datasets/BSI/BSI.M.U2.N.R.L40.L.1.A1.3000.Z01.E", "rate": "https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2026/html/ecb.mp261029~9a493adf17.en.html"}, "assumptions": "Fixed eligible base, fixed total bank balances, and additional requirement funded from eligible remunerated balances. Institution-level allowance threshold effects not modelled. Simple annualisation = principal times annual rate, equivalent to360days under actual/360. No rate forecast or adopted2percent ratio asserted."} The deposit rate changes the interest shift ≈177.6 €bn reclassified to 0% 0 2 4 6 8 €bn/year 0 1 2 2.5 3 4 1.78 3.55 5.33 7.10 2.50% in force 4.44 €bn/year Deposit rate, % per year
The deposit rate changes the interest shift Arithmetic sensitivity using simple annualisation of about 177.6 billion euros reclassified to 0%. Rates of 1,2,3 and 4 percent are hypothetical. The only rate in force on 19 November 2026 is 2.50 percent, effective since 16 September and maintained on 29 October. The base and balances are fixed. {"stock_date": "2026-11-18", "base_period": "2026-09", "maintenance_period": "2026-11-04/2026-12-22", "base_observation_comment": "MP202607", "required_reserves_status": "provisional", "current_ratio_percent": 1, "scenario_ratio_percent": 2, "rate_effective_date": "2026-09-16", "rate_confirmation_date": "2026-10-29", "base_eur_billion": "17762.06925346491", "extra_before_institution_threshold_effects_eur_billion": "177.6206925346491", "total_current_accounts_plus_deposit_facility_eur_billion": "2264.080", "sources": {"liquidity": "https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/liq/html/index.en.html", "daily_csv": "https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/pdf/monetary/lm/liq_daily_2026.zip", "deposits": "https://data.ecb.europa.eu/data/datasets/BSI/BSI.M.U2.N.R.L2B.L.1.A1.3000.Z01.E", "debt": "https://data.ecb.europa.eu/data/datasets/BSI/BSI.M.U2.N.R.L40.L.1.A1.3000.Z01.E", "rate": "https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2026/html/ecb.mp261029~9a493adf17.en.html"}, "assumptions": "Fixed eligible base, fixed total bank balances, and additional requirement funded from eligible remunerated balances. Institution-level allowance threshold effects not modelled. Simple annualisation = principal times annual rate, equivalent to360days under actual/360. No rate forecast or adopted2percent ratio asserted."} Interest shift by deposit rate ≈177.6 €bn reclassified to 0% 0 2 4 6 8 €bn/year 0 1 2 2.5 3 4 1.78 3.55 5.33 7.10 2.50% in force 4.44 €bn/year Deposit rate, % per year
FIG. 02The scenario holds about €177.6 billion of additional unremunerated reserves fixed and varies the rate banks would forgo. The only current policy rate shown is 2.50%.Sources: ECB, reserve base referenced to September 2026 · 29 October 2026 decision · CSV data and calculations.l0g calculation: principal × annual rate, a simple annualisation equivalent to 360 days under actual/360. The 2.50% rate has applied since 16 September 2026. Other rates show a sensitivity. The base and balances are fixed, before institution-level allowance threshold effects.

How the cost could reach customers

Consider a hypothetical bank with €10 billion of liabilities subject to the positive reserve ratio. After the allowance, its current requirement would be €99.9 million. At 2%, that would rise to €199.9 million. Funding the additional €100 million from balances earning 2.50% would cost €2.5 million in interest income on a simple annualised basis. S03 · S06

Relative to the €10 billion base, the charge is 0.025%, or 2.5 basis points, on the same simple annualised basis. A basis point is one hundredth of a percentage point. This gives a sense of scale before additional funding costs, tax and commercial responses. A bank facing deposit outflows or thin margins could experience the same charge more acutely. S03 · S06 · S23

The first effect would be lower interest income. Management could absorb the cost in its margin, offer less attractive deposit rates or seek higher returns on new loans. Fees and changes to the funding mix offer other possible adjustments. The response would depend on competition, existing contracts, customers’ alternatives and the profitability of each business. Deposit rates and the pricing of new loans would show how much of the cost banks pass on. S20 · S21 · S23

Empirical research nevertheless gives a reason to watch lending. A Bundesbank working paper published in 2024 examines the tightening cycle that began in 2022. Credit supply at banks with greater excess reserve holdings was less sensitive to monetary tightening. Reserve income can therefore matter for monetary transmission. The paper studies a different policy experience. It provides a mechanism to investigate, with no coefficient directly applicable to the November 2026 proposal. S20

A study published in 2025 examines the two-tier remuneration system introduced in 2019. It finds that reallocating reserves towards banks with high liquidity needs supported lending. Distribution matters alongside the aggregate quantity: which banks hold the available balances, and which would need to obtain more? S21

This distinction is essential when reading the €2,086.727 billion of excess liquidity reported for 18 November. The aggregate looks ample relative to an additional requirement of about €177.6 billion. Individual banks still have to manage their own payments, market access and available collateral. Making a loan creates a claim on the borrower and a deposit. The bank must then be able to settle the resulting payments. Funding conditions and risk constraints connect reserves to lending decisions. S07 · S23 · S13

The route to government budgets

On the public side, each euro of interest saved first improves a central bank’s financial result. Reaching a government budget takes further steps. Part of the national central banks’ monetary income and expenses is pooled and redistributed under Eurosystem rules. The ECB keeps separate accounts and does not participate in that pool. Where banks hold their reserves is only one part of the fiscal picture. S18 · S19

Accumulated losses also matter. The Bundesbank lost €8.6 billion in 2025, taking its accumulated loss to €27.8 billion. It says future profits will be used to absorb those losses and rebuild provisions, delaying the resumption of distributions to the federal budget. Lower interest expense would help repair the balance sheet, all else equal. The saving and a government’s cash dividend in the same year would still be different accounting outcomes. S16

The French accounts show a different path. The Banque de France reported an €8.1 billion profit for 2025, allocated to clearing the €7.7 billion loss carried over from 2024 and adding €0.4 billion to a specific reserve. An exceptional €11 billion foreign exchange gain made a substantial contribution to the result. Those accounts show how strongly returns can depend on the assets a central bank holds. S17

A central bank’s public purpose remains the fulfilment of its mandate. BIS researchers point out that losses, and even negative equity, can coexist with effective monetary policy. Financial results have fiscal and political consequences. Taken alone, they provide little evidence of success in controlling inflation. S14

The money market test

The strongest argument for raising the requirement concerns the cost of implementing monetary policy. When the ECB set required-reserve remuneration to zero in 2023, it argued that it could reduce interest expense while retaining control over money market rates. A larger required portion could pursue that logic while reserves remain abundant. The outcome would depend on liquidity conditions and banks’ behaviour. S04

The main risk emerges as that abundance recedes. The APP and PEPP bond portfolios are shrinking as maturing principal is no longer reinvested. A higher requirement would simultaneously increase demand for reserves. The operational framework provides refinancing against eligible collateral. Assessing the full cost of the change would therefore require monitoring the price and distribution of funding, alongside money market rates. S06 · S22 · S23

An ECB analysis published on 2 April 2026 found that reserves were being redistributed smoothly across banks and euro area countries, even though some banks were closer to their preferred level of holdings than others. If the requirement is raised, changes in liquidity trading and refinancing use will show how banks adapt beyond the initial loss of interest income. S24

Calling the measure a “tax” captures its initial economic burden: a compulsory holding with a zero return entails forgone income. Its legal form is a reserve requirement serving monetary policy objectives. Judgement would turn on the ECB’s rationale, the chosen calibration and the effects on transmission. Treating the entire €4.4 billion as a charge borne by bank shareholders would go beyond the evidence. S03 · S04 · S20

If the Council acts, the ratio, start date and maintenance rules will let us calculate the interest at stake again. Bank earnings, refinancing demand and changes in customer rates will show where the cost actually falls.

For the underlying accounts, see our guide to reading the ECB balance sheet and analysis of losses on bond purchases.

Sources

  1. S01 · Reuters · Published: 2026-11-18 · Accessed: 2026-11-19Reported discussion
    Passages and scope

    Reuters cites four sources familiar with the discussions. It reports 25 November as the date of the debate. Reuters says a decision could come on 17 December.

  2. S02 · ECB · Published: not stated · Accessed: 2026-11-19Meeting calendar
    Passages and scope

    The calendar lists 25 November as a non-monetary-policy meeting. It sets out dates without a detailed agenda.

  3. S03 · Official Journal of the EU · Version: 2023-09-20 · Accessed: 2026-11-19Reserve base and calculation
    Passages and scope

    Articles 3, 5 and 6. Average holdings, reserve base, exclusions, 1% positive ratio and €100,000 allowance.

  4. S04 · ECB · Published: 2023-07-27 · Accessed: 2026-11-19Zero remuneration
    Passages and scope

    Announcement on 27 July. Remuneration of the required portion fell to zero from the maintenance period beginning 20 September 2023.

  5. S05 · Official Journal of the EU · Published: 2026-04-10 · Accessed: 2026-11-19Decision 2026/812
    Passages and scope

    Decision (EU) 2026/812 of 26 March. The new regime for excess current-account balances applies from 17 June, with exceptions linked to deposit-facility access.

  6. S06 · ECB · Published: 2026-10-29 · Accessed: 2026-11-1929 October decision
    Passages and scope

    The Governing Council keeps the deposit facility rate at 2.50%. It also reports that principal from maturing APP and PEPP securities is no longer reinvested.

  7. S07 · ECB · Published: not stated · Observation: 2026-11-18 · Accessed: 2026-11-19Liquidity on 18 November
    Passages and scope

    Daily table in millions of euros. Observation on 18 November. The maintenance period runs from 4 November to 22 December 2026. Components are rounded independently.

  8. S08 · ECB · Updated: 2026-11-11 · Accessed: 2026-11-19Deposit reserve base
    Passages and scope

    Series BSI.M.U2.N.R.L2B.L.1.A1.3000.Z01.E, September 2026, observation comment MP202607. Deposits subject to the positive ratio: €17,088,406.86287791 million.

  9. S09 · ECB · Updated: 2026-11-11 · Accessed: 2026-11-19Debt-security reserve base
    Passages and scope

    Series BSI.M.U2.N.R.L40.L.1.A1.3000.Z01.E, September 2026, observation comment MP202607. Debt securities with original maturity of up to two years: €673,662.390587 million.

  10. S10 · ECB · Updated: 2026-11-11 · Accessed: 2026-11-19Maintenance-period requirement
    Passages and scope

    Series BSI.M.U2.N.R.MRR.X.1.A1.3000.Z01.E, period MP202607. The €177,314 million observation is provisional. The December index marks the period’s end month.

  11. S11 · Official Journal of the EU · Published: 2015-04-02 · Accessed: 2026-11-19Actual/360 convention
    Passages and scope

    Article 23(2). Simple interest on the deposit facility uses the actual number of days over a 360-day basis.

  12. S12 · ECB · Published: not stated · Accessed: 2026-11-19Reserve creation and circulation
    Passages and scope

    Economic Bulletin 6/2021, Box 3. Reserve creation and circulation between banks.

  13. S13 · Bank of England · Published: 2014-03-14 · Accessed: 2026-11-19Money creation
    Passages and scope

    The article distinguishes customer deposits from bank reserves and traces an asset purchase from a non-bank seller.

  14. S14 · BIS · Published: 2023-02-07 · Accessed: 2026-11-19Central bank losses
    Passages and scope

    Bulletin 68. Interest-rate risk after asset purchases and the distinction between accounting losses and monetary-policy capacity.

  15. S15 · ECB · Published: 2026-02-26 · Accessed: 2026-11-192025 financial statements
    Passages and scope

    Release of the ECB’s own 2025 accounts. Losses compared with 2024 and changes in net interest expense.

  16. S16 · Bundesbank · Published: not stated · Accessed: 2026-11-19Losses and distributions
    Passages and scope

    2025 financial year, questions 12 and 15. Annual loss, accumulated losses and stated use of future profits.

  17. S17 · Banque de France · Published: 2026-03-25 · Accessed: 2026-11-192025 result
    Passages and scope

    2025 result, allocation against the 2024 loss, specific reserve and exceptional foreign exchange gain. The release gives rounded amounts.

  18. S18 · Banque de France · Published: 2025-10-31 · Accessed: 2026-11-19Monetary-income sharing
    Passages and scope

    Bulletin 260/6, pages 3–7. Pooling and redistribution of monetary income among national central banks.

  19. S19 · ECB · Published: not stated · Accessed: 2026-11-19Scope and accounts
    Passages and scope

    The sections on financial results distinguish the ECB’s accounts from those of national central banks and describe how they interact.

  20. S20 · Fricke, Greppmair and Paludkiewicz · Published: 2024-02-12 · Accessed: 2026-11-19Reserves and lending
    Passages and scope

    Discussion Paper 05/2024, pages 16–19. The study estimates the lending response during the tightening that began in 2022.

  21. S21 · Altavilla et al. · Published: 2025-04-03 · Accessed: 2026-11-19Reallocation and lending
    Passages and scope

    Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 168. The paper studies the two-tier remuneration system introduced in 2019.

  22. S22 · ECB · Published: 2024-03-13 · Accessed: 2026-11-19Operational framework
    Passages and scope

    Operational framework announced in March 2024. Refinancing against eligible collateral and retention of the minimum reserve parameters at that date.

  23. S23 · Buch and Schnabel · Published: 2025-03-18 · Accessed: 2026-11-19Liquidity management
    Passages and scope

    Two Executive Board members explain reserve distribution, bank liquidity management and refinancing operations.

  24. S24 · ECB · Published: 2026-04-02 · Accessed: 2026-11-19Banks’ adjustment
    Passages and scope

    Analysis of reserve redistribution and refinancing. The post’s latest market data are from 30 March 2026.

  25. S25 · ECB · Published: not stated · Accessed: 2026-11-19Excess-liquidity definition
    Passages and scope

    Economic Bulletin 6/2026, excess liquidity section. The net measure subtracts marginal lending.

  26. S26 · Bundesbank · Published: not stated · Accessed: 2026-11-19Minimum reserves
    Passages and scope

    Implementation guide for minimum reserves. The 1% ratio and average compliance over the maintenance period.

  27. S27 · ECB · Published: 2026-05-04 · Accessed: 2026-11-19New excess-reserve regime
    Passages and scope

    Decisions other than those setting rates. The market operations section describes the regime applicable from 17 June 2026.

  28. S28 · ECB · Published: not stated · Accessed: 2026-11-19Standing facility rates
    Passages and scope

    Historical table of rates. The deposit facility rate has been 2.50% since 16 September 2026.

This analysis is not investment advice.

// cite this analysis

l0g, “The ECB’s €4.4 billion reserve question”, l0g.fr, published November 19, 2026, updated November 19, 2026, https://l0g.fr/en/analysis/ecb-minimum-reserves-banks-customers-income-shift/


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