// analysis
Deutsche Bank’s 173-day exit from MKB
Open the documentsThe source documents
The documents cited in the analysis and, where identified, their associated passages. An automatically detected association is not a verified claim.
- FATF · correspondent guidance ↗Source date not identified
- FATF, BIS and FSB · correspondent withdrawals ↗2016
- Fed · July 2023 order ↗Source date not identified

Sources and reading context
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Contents8 sections
In a 5 June 2020 email reported by Follow the Money, Deutsche Bank told its German supervisor, BaFin, that cutting off Hungary’s MKB too abruptly could leave it short of liquidity within days. Deutsche was trying to leave a troubled relationship. For MKB, losing its correspondent threatened the international payments service it provided to its own customers. S01
The exchange is part of Project Wingman, Deutsche Bank’s investigation into a network of suspicious transactions reconstructed around 2020. It brings a practical question into view. When a concern is serious enough to occupy the bank’s financial-crime specialists, how soon does it change the payments the bank is still willing to process?
The Inside Deutsche Bank investigation, published from 17 November 2026, sheds light on those decisions. Coordinated by Barracuda Media, it draws on more than fifteen million files supplied by whistleblowers. We examined its published reporting alongside supervisory orders and Deutsche Bank’s public disclosures, following our review of the Epstein case. Our account of the leaked records relies on the journalists who reviewed them. S04 · S03
The customer is another bank
Correspondent banking starts with an everyday need. A company wants to pay someone abroad. Its bank can keep an account at another bank able to process payments in the required currency and system. It sends instructions and uses that account to get the money to its destination. The relationship with Deutsche Bank gave MKB access to services for its own customers. S07 · S02
The two banks hold different information. MKB holds the account-opening file for the business ordering the payment. Deutsche Bank receives payment information and has a commercial relationship with MKB. Assessing the respondent therefore means understanding the customers it serves, how it checks them and the quality of its replies when a transfer looks unusual. The Financial Action Task Force, the international standard setter for anti-money laundering, describes this allocation of responsibilities in its guidance. S08
Consider a company that describes its business as international trade. Payments to several countries could fit that description. Their meaning changes if the counterparties, purposes and timing reveal circulation with a weak commercial explanation. Checking whether a name appears on a list can answer only part of the question. The bank also needs to understand connections between transfers and obtain evidence that explains them. This is the purpose of monitoring proportionate to risk. S09
The service itself complicates the decision to withdraw. Closing a correspondent account can affect businesses making legitimate payments. International authorities have warned for years about the effects of widespread correspondent withdrawals on trade, remittances and access to finance. An orderly transition can therefore have a sound justification. Its adequacy in a particular case depends on the safeguards applied while the relationship stays open. S10
Ten entities had already been reported
Wingman illustrates the difficulty of bringing separate signals together. Le Monde reports that ten of the fifteen entities placed at the centre of the network had already featured in suspicious activity reports. Some of the warning signs were therefore present before the wider network was reconstructed. S05
ZDF describes an analyst spotting identical payment purposes and widening the review to transactions from 2017 to 2020. It puts the value of transactions reported in the case at €1.78 billion. That is the value of activity considered suspicious within the investigation’s scope. How much has been established in court as criminal proceeds remains unknown. S06
A monitoring operation can generate alerts while missing the organisation behind them. Counting reports sent to the authorities offers only a partial measure of performance. The more revealing questions concern connections between recipients, answers obtained from the respondent and the effect of those answers on the banking relationship. Basel Committee guidance calls for the risk assessment to be updated and for senior management to decide how to respond when significant new risk factors emerge. S09
A 173-day exit
Direkt36 dates the decision to end the MKB relationship to 16 April 2020. On 8 May, the Hungarian bank received a notice allowing thirty days. Follow the Money dates the eventual withdrawal of clearing access to 6 October. The interval between the decision to end the relationship and the withdrawal of clearing access was 173 calendar days. Le Monde reports that Deutsche Bank filed further suspicious activity reports that summer. S02 · S01 · S05
In its response to the consortium, Deutsche Bank defended a controlled transition with monitoring maintained. That approach has an operational rationale. A bank losing a correspondent must find another route, arrange migration and notify the parties involved. Assessing the time allowed would require details of which payments could still go through and which restrictions applied. The published record provides only some of those details. S01 · S08
The interval creates an exposure of its own. Keeping the relationship open to prevent disruption preserves some of the risk that prompted the exit. Compliance must then have visible operational consequences. Restricting services, checking supporting records or subjecting payments to enhanced scrutiny changes what can still pass through. FATF guidance envisages such measures when a correspondent manages a risky relationship. S08
The value of suspicious transactions processed after the 16 April decision remains undisclosed. The €1.78 billion covers several years. S06
Reporting triggers several decisions
German law helps explain why a suspicious transaction report and the end of a customer relationship can be separated in time. Section 43 of the Money Laundering Act, the Geldwäschegesetz, requires a report to the financial intelligence unit without delay when the statutory indicators are present. It conveys a suspicion to the authority responsible for analysing it. Criminal liability depends on the subsequent examination of the facts and responsibilities. S11
For a reported transaction which is still pending, section 46 imposes a waiting rule. It can proceed once the competent authority gives consent, or once the third working day after the report was sent has expired without a prohibition. Saturdays are excluded. The law also permits execution where postponement is impossible or could obstruct the pursuit of a suspected offence, with reporting immediately afterwards. The essential rule was already in force before 2020. S12 · S16
The transaction’s timetable leaves the customer assessment to be dealt with. The bank must monitor the relationship and update its information. Section 10(9) requires termination when specified basic customer due diligence duties can no longer be fulfilled. Section 15 requires enhanced measures for respondent banks in the European Economic Area whose risk is assessed as high. Hungary is part of that area. The level of risk and the bank’s ability to manage it therefore matter to the action required. S13 · S14
The Danske Estonia precedent
The case of Danske Bank’s Estonian branch has a public record that goes beyond the leaked reporting. An order issued by New York’s Department of Financial Services, the NYDFS, describes a correspondent at the maximum internal risk rating from September 2010. A draft dated 6 November 2013 considered closing the account or limiting service to Estonian residents. The regulator says it appears to have remained uncirculated until the relationship ended. It also records that Deutsche Bank kept the relationship because of its business with the wider Danske group and its belief that the risks could be managed. Closure came on 7 October 2015. S18
That case locates the difficulty in the move from assessment to action, even when the risk level is already known. A proposal in a file has a different effect from an instruction applied in the payments system. The order documents the gap between the two. S18
In July 2023, the Federal Reserve imposed a further penalty on Deutsche Bank. It recorded more than $267 billion cleared for Danske Estonia from 2007 to 2015, with controls it found inadequate. This figure measures payments processed. The order split a $186.392 million total penalty into $46.2 million relating to Danske and $140.192 million for breaches of earlier orders. It was a supervisory settlement entered into without admitting or denying the allegations. S19
The US orders establish findings within their own scope. They help frame the questions raised by Wingman by directing attention to the consequences given to known warning signs. Responsibility in the Hungarian case must be assessed from its own evidence. In its response to the consortium, Deutsche Bank said it had made the required reports and had received no fine in connection with Wingman. S02
Deutsche Bank’s monitoring controls in 2026
In Hungary, MNB, the central bank and supervisor, has published findings on controls over transit accounts. In August 2022 it reported a HUF46.875 million penalty imposed on MKB at the end of 2021. It also said that the prescribed corrections had been completed in the first half of 2022. The review covered transit accounts from January 2018. The release leaves any specific connection to Wingman unstated. S20
A later review, covering a period beginning in January 2022, led to a HUF10 million fine for MBH in February 2024. MBH is the group formed in part from MKB. The supervisor found delays in handling alerts and filing reports, alongside gaps in information on the origin of funds. It also recorded improvement since the earlier examination and judged that the violations found in its sample were non-systemic. Both assessments appear in the same release. S21 · S23
On 7 January 2025, the MNB reported that MBH had only partly carried out the earlier orders. It pointed to staffing shortfalls in handling alerts and incomplete checks on the source of funds. The supervisor announced HUF 15 million in fines for MBH across the follow-up decisions. S29
For Deutsche Bank, a recent regulatory disclosure brings the issue forward to the present. The 4 November 2026 supplement to its registration document lists ongoing Frankfurt prosecutor investigations into allegations concerning financial-crime controls, particularly late suspicious activity reports. It also discloses related searches of its offices. This information was public before the leak began to be published on 17 November. S24
On 15 September 2026, BaFin had set new deadlines for work on transaction-monitoring systems. It published the notice on 9 October. That action places the issue within an unfinished programme of corrective work. Reuters reports that BaFin cited changed technical requirements for revising earlier timetables. The detailed deadlines were outside the official material we could inspect. S25 · S26
Deutsche Bank, for its part, describes a substantial transformation. In its 17 November response it reported €7 billion of direct investment in controls between 2019 and 2025. That covers a broader area than anti-money laundering. Its registration document also records the end of the BaFin special representative’s mandate on 30 October 2024. Its public account of the work sets out a more specific target, to have roughly 95% of transactions covered by new monitoring systems by the end of 2027 at the latest. This is the bank’s stated objective. S27 · S24 · S28
Measuring effectiveness requires more information. System coverage describes the scope of activity entering a monitoring process. Deutsche Bank’s page leaves the detailed counting convention and the current coverage rate unspecified. The results depend on the quality of the input data, the time taken to handle alerts and the decisions those alerts prompt. The public material gives more detail about implementation milestones than about performance on a network comparable to Wingman.
Assessing the MKB exit would require matching the restrictions imposed with the payments allowed through until 6 October.
Sources
- Follow the Money · Wingman
Passages and scope
Consortium reconstruction from their reporting on internal records, including the 5 June email and the withdrawal of clearing access.
- Direkt36 · the MKB exit
Passages and scope
Consortium reconstruction. Internal decision on 16 April and notice on 8 May 2020.
- Investigative Journalism Bureau · methodology
Passages and scope
Research partner’s account of the investigation and its release. Updated 18 November 2026.
- Consortium · methodology
Passages and scope
Consortium description of the collection and review. l0g worked from the published reporting.
- Le Monde · the fifteen entities
Passages and scope
Ten of the fifteen central entities had already been the subject of suspicious activity reports. Shares the consortium’s underlying evidence.
- ZDF · reported payments
Passages and scope
Reported transactions between 2017 and 2020. The total covers the inquiry’s scope over several years.
- BIS · correspondent banking
Passages and scope
FSI Insights 28, paragraphs 1–5, on settlement and due diligence in correspondent banking.
- FATF · correspondent guidance
Passages and scope
Paragraphs 13, 18–22, 29–35 and 39–41 on correspondent relationships and managing risk.
- Basel Committee · due diligence
Passages and scope
Module AFS10, paragraphs 10.105–146 on managing correspondent banking risk and escalating material changes.
- FATF, BIS and FSB · correspondent withdrawals
Passages and scope
Joint statement on access to financial services and the impact of wholesale withdrawals.
- GwG §43 · reporting to the FIU
Passages and scope
German Money Laundering Act, duty to report suspicion to the financial intelligence unit.
- GwG §46 · executing reported transactions
Passages and scope
German Money Laundering Act, rule for carrying out a reported transaction.
- GwG §10 · ongoing due diligence
Passages and scope
German Money Laundering Act, ongoing review and termination where specified core requirements cannot be met.
- GwG §15 · enhanced due diligence
Passages and scope
German Money Laundering Act, enhanced due diligence for higher-risk relationships.
- Bundestag · reporting rules in 2018
Passages and scope
Drucksache 19/4421, question 7, printed pages 4–5. The reply is dated 19 September and describes the rules in force in 2018.
- NYDFS · order, §§84–105
Passages and scope
Paragraphs 84–105 concern the Danske Estonia relationship. The order and its total fine have a wider scope.
- Fed · July 2023 order
Passages and scope
Pages 3–4 and section 5(a), page 8. Volume cleared and breakdown of the 2023 civil money penalty.
- MNB · transit-account review
Passages and scope
Review of transit accounts since January 2018. The December 2021 fine and completion of prescribed measures in the first half of 2022 are reported here.
- MNB · 2024 review
Passages and scope
Review starting in January 2022. Delays, other shortcomings, progress and assessment of the violations found in the sample.
- MBH · merger history
Passages and scope
MBH prospectus, p. 161, on consolidation and the new name effective in May 2023.
- Deutsche Bank · 4 November supplement
Passages and scope
Consolidated registration document, pp. 20 and 87, on the special representative and Frankfurt prosecutor investigations.
- BaFin · remediation deadlines
Passages and scope
Official index entry on 9 October, reporting BaFin’s decision of 15 September. Detailed notice outside the material accessed.
- Reuters · revised timetable
Passages and scope
Reuters reports changed technical requirements behind revisions to previous deadlines.
- Deutsche Bank · 17 November response
Passages and scope
Bank statement after the consortium’s reporting, including its total direct investment across the control environment.
- Deutsche Bank · reported rollout
Passages and scope
Rollout reported by the bank and its target for the share of transactions covered by new systems. Current coverage is unspecified.
- MNB · follow-up on MBH’s anti-money laundering controls
Passages and scope
Follow-up on earlier orders, including the February 2024 decision. The HUF 15 million total is for MBH across the follow-up decisions. The release does not identify Wingman.
Limitations
Research cut-off is 19 November 2026. This l0g documentary investigation draws on the Inside Deutsche Bank publications, supervisory records, applicable law and the institutions’ public statements. The consortium’s articles share a source corpus. The original leaked files, complete regulatory case files and exhaustive payment histories were outside our evidence set. The published accounts differ on the direction and value of some transfers between companies. The timeline uses events the reporting allows us to date.
This analysis is not investment advice.
// cite this analysis
l0g, “Deutsche Bank’s 173-day exit from MKB”, l0g.fr, published November 19, 2026, updated November 19, 2026, https://l0g.fr/en/analysis/deutsche-bank-wingman-alerts-correspondent-banking/
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