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Deutsche Bank’s 173-day exit from MKB

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dated revision: November 19, 2026primary sourcesno tracker
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In a 5 June 2020 email reported by Follow the Money, Deutsche Bank told its German supervisor, BaFin, that cutting off Hungary’s MKB too abruptly could leave it short of liquidity within days. Deutsche was trying to leave a troubled relationship. For MKB, losing its correspondent threatened the international payments service it provided to its own customers. S01

The exchange is part of Project Wingman, Deutsche Bank’s investigation into a network of suspicious transactions reconstructed around 2020. It brings a practical question into view. When a concern is serious enough to occupy the bank’s financial-crime specialists, how soon does it change the payments the bank is still willing to process?

The Inside Deutsche Bank investigation, published from 17 November 2026, sheds light on those decisions. Coordinated by Barracuda Media, it draws on more than fifteen million files supplied by whistleblowers. We examined its published reporting alongside supervisory orders and Deutsche Bank’s public disclosures, following our review of the Epstein case. Our account of the leaked records relies on the journalists who reviewed them. S04 · S03

The customer is another bank

Correspondent banking starts with an everyday need. A company wants to pay someone abroad. Its bank can keep an account at another bank able to process payments in the required currency and system. It sends instructions and uses that account to get the money to its destination. The relationship with Deutsche Bank gave MKB access to services for its own customers. S07 · S02

The two banks hold different information. MKB holds the account-opening file for the business ordering the payment. Deutsche Bank receives payment information and has a commercial relationship with MKB. Assessing the respondent therefore means understanding the customers it serves, how it checks them and the quality of its replies when a transfer looks unusual. The Financial Action Task Force, the international standard setter for anti-money laundering, describes this allocation of responsibilities in its guidance. S08

MKB’s correspondent accountA customer sends an instruction to MKB. Its Deutsche Bank account supports settlement to the beneficiary’s bank. Deutsche Bank requests supporting information from MKB, which replies. General mechanism, without reconstructing an individual payment. MKB’s correspondent accountPayment and supporting informationCustomerPaymentinstructionMKBKnows its clientand transactionsDeutsche BankMKB’s accountAssesses its bank clientand payment messagesBeneficiary’sbankCreditInformation requestMKB’s documented reply
MKB’s correspondent accountA customer sends an instruction to MKB. Its Deutsche Bank account supports settlement to the beneficiary’s bank. Deutsche Bank requests supporting information from MKB, which replies. General mechanism, without reconstructing an individual payment. MKB’s accountPayment and informationCustomerPaymentinstructionMKBIts customer andtheir transactionsDeutsche BankMKB’s accountBank-client and payment monitoringPaymentEvidenceReplyBeneficiary’s bankCredits the recipient’s account
FIG. 01MKB knows the end customer. Deutsche Bank holds its bank client’s account and monitors the payment messages it handles. Requests for supporting information and replies pass between the two institutions.Source: BIS / FSI: correspondent banking · FATF, 2016 guidance.General mechanism, without reconstructing an individual payment. Arrows show payment and information flows, without a monetary scale.

Consider a company that describes its business as international trade. Payments to several countries could fit that description. Their meaning changes if the counterparties, purposes and timing reveal circulation with a weak commercial explanation. Checking whether a name appears on a list can answer only part of the question. The bank also needs to understand connections between transfers and obtain evidence that explains them. This is the purpose of monitoring proportionate to risk. S09

The service itself complicates the decision to withdraw. Closing a correspondent account can affect businesses making legitimate payments. International authorities have warned for years about the effects of widespread correspondent withdrawals on trade, remittances and access to finance. An orderly transition can therefore have a sound justification. Its adequacy in a particular case depends on the safeguards applied while the relationship stays open. S10

Ten entities had already been reported

Wingman illustrates the difficulty of bringing separate signals together. Le Monde reports that ten of the fifteen entities placed at the centre of the network had already featured in suspicious activity reports. Some of the warning signs were therefore present before the wider network was reconstructed. S05

ZDF describes an analyst spotting identical payment purposes and widening the review to transactions from 2017 to 2020. It puts the value of transactions reported in the case at €1.78 billion. That is the value of activity considered suspicious within the investigation’s scope. How much has been established in court as criminal proceeds remains unknown. S06

A monitoring operation can generate alerts while missing the organisation behind them. Counting reports sent to the authorities offers only a partial measure of performance. The more revealing questions concern connections between recipients, answers obtained from the respondent and the effect of those answers on the banking relationship. Basel Committee guidance calls for the risk assessment to be updated and for senior management to decide how to respond when significant new risk factors emerge. S09

A 173-day exit

Direkt36 dates the decision to end the MKB relationship to 16 April 2020. On 8 May, the Hungarian bank received a notice allowing thirty days. Follow the Money dates the eventual withdrawal of clearing access to 6 October. The interval between the decision to end the relationship and the withdrawal of clearing access was 173 calendar days. Le Monde reports that Deutsche Bank filed further suspicious activity reports that summer. S02 · S01 · S05

In its response to the consortium, Deutsche Bank defended a controlled transition with monitoring maintained. That approach has an operational rationale. A bank losing a correspondent must find another route, arrange migration and notify the parties involved. Assessing the time allowed would require details of which payments could still go through and which restrictions applied. The published record provides only some of those details. S01 · S08

173 days from decision to withdrawalProportional timeline from the exit decision on 16 April 2020 to withdrawal of clearing access on 6 October 2020. Notice was sent on 8 May and liquidity risk cited on 5 June. Reporting also describes additional suspicious activity reports during the transition. 173 days from decision to withdrawalMKB · April–October 2020 · proportional axisMAYJUNJULAUGSEPOCT.16 APRILInternal decision5 JUNELiquidity risk cited6 OCTOBERClearing access withdrawn8 MAY · thirty-day noticeFurther transactions reported during the transitionTotal value of these flows remains unestablished
173 days from decision to withdrawalProportional timeline from the exit decision on 16 April 2020 to withdrawal of clearing access on 6 October 2020. Notice was sent on 8 May and liquidity risk cited on 5 June. Reporting also describes additional suspicious activity reports during the transition. A 173-day transitionMKB · 2020 · proportional axis16 APRILInternal decision8 MAYThirty-daynotice5 JUNELiquidity riskcitedFurther reportsduring the transition6 OCTOBERClearing access withdrawn
FIG. 02From 16 April to 6 October 2020, 173 calendar days separate the internal exit decision from withdrawal of clearing access. On 5 June, Deutsche Bank cites a risk to MKB’s liquidity.Source: Direkt36, 18 November 2026 · Follow the Money, withdrawal of clearing access.Proportional axis calculated from published dates. The interval’s total suspect flow and detailed payment restrictions remain unknown.

The interval creates an exposure of its own. Keeping the relationship open to prevent disruption preserves some of the risk that prompted the exit. Compliance must then have visible operational consequences. Restricting services, checking supporting records or subjecting payments to enhanced scrutiny changes what can still pass through. FATF guidance envisages such measures when a correspondent manages a risky relationship. S08

The value of suspicious transactions processed after the 16 April decision remains undisclosed. The €1.78 billion covers several years. S06

Reporting triggers several decisions

German law helps explain why a suspicious transaction report and the end of a customer relationship can be separated in time. Section 43 of the Money Laundering Act, the Geldwäschegesetz, requires a report to the financial intelligence unit without delay when the statutory indicators are present. It conveys a suspicion to the authority responsible for analysing it. Criminal liability depends on the subsequent examination of the facts and responsibilities. S11

For a reported transaction which is still pending, section 46 imposes a waiting rule. It can proceed once the competent authority gives consent, or once the third working day after the report was sent has expired without a prohibition. Saturdays are excluded. The law also permits execution where postponement is impossible or could obstruct the pursuit of a suspected offence, with reporting immediately afterwards. The essential rule was already in force before 2020. S12 · S16

Reporting and payment executionGeneral German framework checked on 19 November 2026. After reporting to the FIU, section 46 provides for a hold pending competent-authority consent or expiry of the third working day after filing without prohibition. A prohibition maintains the hold. Section46(2) exceptions are identified in the caption. Relationship due diligence continues separately. Reporting and payment executionGermany · law checked on 19 November 2026Report to the FIU · section 43Payment on hold · section 46Consent receivedFIU or prosecutorTime elapsedThird working day after filingwithout prohibitionProhibitionFIU or prosecutorExecution possibleHold maintainedBanking relationship: continuing due diligence, separate from this payment
Reporting and payment executionGeneral German framework checked on 19 November 2026. After reporting to the FIU, section 46 provides for a hold pending competent-authority consent or expiry of the third working day after filing without prohibition. A prohibition maintains the hold. Section46(2) exceptions are identified in the caption. Relationship due diligence continues separately. Payment after reportingGermany · framework at 19 November 2026Report to FIU · section 43Payment on hold · section 46FIU or prosecutorgives consentThird working dayafter filing ends,without prohibitionFIU or prosecutorprohibits paymentExecutionpossibleHoldmaintainedBanking relationship: ongoing checksand a separate review of the relationship
FIG. 03German law checked on 19 November 2026: section 46 governs the hold after an FIU report. Competent-authority consent, or expiry of the third working day after filing without prohibition, permits execution subject to other duties. Saturday is excluded from the count.Source: GwG sections 43 and 46; due diligence: section 10.Section46(2) provides exceptions to the hold, followed by reporting without delay. Relationship due diligence continues separately; section 10(9) addresses termination when the specified obligations cannot be met.

The transaction’s timetable leaves the customer assessment to be dealt with. The bank must monitor the relationship and update its information. Section 10(9) requires termination when specified basic customer due diligence duties can no longer be fulfilled. Section 15 requires enhanced measures for respondent banks in the European Economic Area whose risk is assessed as high. Hungary is part of that area. The level of risk and the bank’s ability to manage it therefore matter to the action required. S13 · S14

The Danske Estonia precedent

The case of Danske Bank’s Estonian branch has a public record that goes beyond the leaked reporting. An order issued by New York’s Department of Financial Services, the NYDFS, describes a correspondent at the maximum internal risk rating from September 2010. A draft dated 6 November 2013 considered closing the account or limiting service to Estonian residents. The regulator says it appears to have remained uncirculated until the relationship ended. It also records that Deutsche Bank kept the relationship because of its business with the wider Danske group and its belief that the risks could be managed. Closure came on 7 October 2015. S18

That case locates the difficulty in the move from assessment to action, even when the risk level is already known. A proposal in a file has a different effect from an instruction applied in the payments system. The order documents the gap between the two. S18

In July 2023, the Federal Reserve imposed a further penalty on Deutsche Bank. It recorded more than $267 billion cleared for Danske Estonia from 2007 to 2015, with controls it found inadequate. This figure measures payments processed. The order split a $186.392 million total penalty into $46.2 million relating to Danske and $140.192 million for breaches of earlier orders. It was a supervisory settlement entered into without admitting or denying the allegations. S19

The US orders establish findings within their own scope. They help frame the questions raised by Wingman by directing attention to the consequences given to known warning signs. Responsibility in the Hungarian case must be assessed from its own evidence. In its response to the consortium, Deutsche Bank said it had made the required reports and had received no fine in connection with Wingman. S02

Deutsche Bank’s monitoring controls in 2026

In Hungary, MNB, the central bank and supervisor, has published findings on controls over transit accounts. In August 2022 it reported a HUF46.875 million penalty imposed on MKB at the end of 2021. It also said that the prescribed corrections had been completed in the first half of 2022. The review covered transit accounts from January 2018. The release leaves any specific connection to Wingman unstated. S20

A later review, covering a period beginning in January 2022, led to a HUF10 million fine for MBH in February 2024. MBH is the group formed in part from MKB. The supervisor found delays in handling alerts and filing reports, alongside gaps in information on the origin of funds. It also recorded improvement since the earlier examination and judged that the violations found in its sample were non-systemic. Both assessments appear in the same release. S21 · S23

On 7 January 2025, the MNB reported that MBH had only partly carried out the earlier orders. It pointed to staffing shortfalls in handling alerts and incomplete checks on the source of funds. The supervisor announced HUF 15 million in fines for MBH across the follow-up decisions. S29

For Deutsche Bank, a recent regulatory disclosure brings the issue forward to the present. The 4 November 2026 supplement to its registration document lists ongoing Frankfurt prosecutor investigations into allegations concerning financial-crime controls, particularly late suspicious activity reports. It also discloses related searches of its offices. This information was public before the leak began to be published on 17 November. S24

On 15 September 2026, BaFin had set new deadlines for work on transaction-monitoring systems. It published the notice on 9 October. That action places the issue within an unfinished programme of corrective work. Reuters reports that BaFin cited changed technical requirements for revising earlier timetables. The detailed deadlines were outside the official material we could inspect. S25 · S26

Deutsche Bank, for its part, describes a substantial transformation. In its 17 November response it reported €7 billion of direct investment in controls between 2019 and 2025. That covers a broader area than anti-money laundering. Its registration document also records the end of the BaFin special representative’s mandate on 30 October 2024. Its public account of the work sets out a more specific target, to have roughly 95% of transactions covered by new monitoring systems by the end of 2027 at the latest. This is the bank’s stated objective. S27 · S24 · S28

Measuring effectiveness requires more information. System coverage describes the scope of activity entering a monitoring process. Deutsche Bank’s page leaves the detailed counting convention and the current coverage rate unspecified. The results depend on the quality of the input data, the time taken to handle alerts and the decisions those alerts prompt. The public material gives more detail about implementation milestones than about performance on a network comparable to Wingman.

Assessing the MKB exit would require matching the restrictions imposed with the payments allowed through until 6 October.

Sources

  1. S01 · Follow the Money · Published: 2026-11-18 · Accessed: 2026-11-19 Follow the Money · Wingman
    Passages and scope

    Consortium reconstruction from their reporting on internal records, including the 5 June email and the withdrawal of clearing access.

  2. S02 · Direkt36 · Published: 2026-11-18 · Accessed: 2026-11-19 Direkt36 · the MKB exit
    Passages and scope

    Consortium reconstruction. Internal decision on 16 April and notice on 8 May 2020.

  3. S03 · Investigative Journalism Bureau · Published: 2026-11-17 · Accessed: 2026-11-19 Investigative Journalism Bureau · methodology
    Passages and scope

    Research partner’s account of the investigation and its release. Updated 18 November 2026.

  4. S04 · Consortium · Published: not stated · Accessed: 2026-11-19 Consortium · methodology
    Passages and scope

    Consortium description of the collection and review. l0g worked from the published reporting.

  5. S05 · Le Monde · Published: 2026-11-18 · Accessed: 2026-11-19 Le Monde · the fifteen entities
    Passages and scope

    Ten of the fifteen central entities had already been the subject of suspicious activity reports. Shares the consortium’s underlying evidence.

  6. S06 · ZDF · Published: 2026-11-18 · Accessed: 2026-11-19 ZDF · reported payments
    Passages and scope

    Reported transactions between 2017 and 2020. The total covers the inquiry’s scope over several years.

  7. S07 · BIS · Published: 2020-08 · Accessed: 2026-11-19 BIS · correspondent banking
    Passages and scope

    FSI Insights 28, paragraphs 1–5, on settlement and due diligence in correspondent banking.

  8. S08 · FATF · Published: 2016-10 · Accessed: 2026-11-19 FATF · correspondent guidance
    Passages and scope

    Paragraphs 13, 18–22, 29–35 and 39–41 on correspondent relationships and managing risk.

  9. S09 · Basel Committee · Published: 2026-01-01 · Accessed: 2026-11-19 Basel Committee · due diligence
    Passages and scope

    Module AFS10, paragraphs 10.105–146 on managing correspondent banking risk and escalating material changes.

  10. S10 · FATF, BIS and FSB · Published: 2018-03-06 · Accessed: 2026-11-19 FATF, BIS and FSB · correspondent withdrawals
    Passages and scope

    Joint statement on access to financial services and the impact of wholesale withdrawals.

  11. S11 · GwG §43 · Published: not stated · Accessed: 2026-11-19 GwG §43 · reporting to the FIU
    Passages and scope

    German Money Laundering Act, duty to report suspicion to the financial intelligence unit.

  12. S12 · GwG §46 · Published: not stated · Accessed: 2026-11-19 GwG §46 · executing reported transactions
    Passages and scope

    German Money Laundering Act, rule for carrying out a reported transaction.

  13. S13 · GwG §10 · Published: not stated · Accessed: 2026-11-19 GwG §10 · ongoing due diligence
    Passages and scope

    German Money Laundering Act, ongoing review and termination where specified core requirements cannot be met.

  14. S14 · GwG §15 · Published: not stated · Accessed: 2026-11-19 GwG §15 · enhanced due diligence
    Passages and scope

    German Money Laundering Act, enhanced due diligence for higher-risk relationships.

  15. S16 · Bundestag · Published: 2018-09-21 · Accessed: 2026-11-19 Bundestag · reporting rules in 2018
    Passages and scope

    Drucksache 19/4421, question 7, printed pages 4–5. The reply is dated 19 September and describes the rules in force in 2018.

  16. S18 · NYDFS · Published: 2020-07-06 · Accessed: 2026-11-19 NYDFS · order, §§84–105
    Passages and scope

    Paragraphs 84–105 concern the Danske Estonia relationship. The order and its total fine have a wider scope.

  17. S19 · Fed · Published: 2023-07-19 · Accessed: 2026-11-19 Fed · July 2023 order
    Passages and scope

    Pages 3–4 and section 5(a), page 8. Volume cleared and breakdown of the 2023 civil money penalty.

  18. S20 · MNB · Published: 2022-08-17 · Accessed: 2026-11-19 MNB · transit-account review
    Passages and scope

    Review of transit accounts since January 2018. The December 2021 fine and completion of prescribed measures in the first half of 2022 are reported here.

  19. S21 · MNB · Published: 2024-02-19 · Accessed: 2026-11-19 MNB · 2024 review
    Passages and scope

    Review starting in January 2022. Delays, other shortcomings, progress and assessment of the violations found in the sample.

  20. S23 · MBH · Published: 2023-10-02 · Accessed: 2026-11-19 MBH · merger history
    Passages and scope

    MBH prospectus, p. 161, on consolidation and the new name effective in May 2023.

  21. S24 · Deutsche Bank · Published: 2026-11-04 · Accessed: 2026-11-19 Deutsche Bank · 4 November supplement
    Passages and scope

    Consolidated registration document, pp. 20 and 87, on the special representative and Frankfurt prosecutor investigations.

  22. S25 · BaFin · Published: 2026-10-09 · Accessed: 2026-11-19 BaFin · remediation deadlines
    Passages and scope

    Official index entry on 9 October, reporting BaFin’s decision of 15 September. Detailed notice outside the material accessed.

  23. S26 · Reuters · Published: 2026-10-09 · Accessed: 2026-11-19 Reuters · revised timetable
    Passages and scope

    Reuters reports changed technical requirements behind revisions to previous deadlines.

  24. S27 · Deutsche Bank · Published: 2026-11-17 · Accessed: 2026-11-19 Deutsche Bank · 17 November response
    Passages and scope

    Bank statement after the consortium’s reporting, including its total direct investment across the control environment.

  25. S28 · Deutsche Bank · Published: not stated · Accessed: 2026-11-19 Deutsche Bank · reported rollout
    Passages and scope

    Rollout reported by the bank and its target for the share of transactions covered by new systems. Current coverage is unspecified.

  26. S29 · MNB · Published: 2025-01-07 · Accessed: 2026-11-19 MNB · follow-up on MBH’s anti-money laundering controls
    Passages and scope

    Follow-up on earlier orders, including the February 2024 decision. The HUF 15 million total is for MBH across the follow-up decisions. The release does not identify Wingman.

Limitations

Research cut-off is 19 November 2026. This l0g documentary investigation draws on the Inside Deutsche Bank publications, supervisory records, applicable law and the institutions’ public statements. The consortium’s articles share a source corpus. The original leaked files, complete regulatory case files and exhaustive payment histories were outside our evidence set. The published accounts differ on the direction and value of some transfers between companies. The timeline uses events the reporting allows us to date.

This analysis is not investment advice.

// cite this analysis

l0g, “Deutsche Bank’s 173-day exit from MKB”, l0g.fr, published November 19, 2026, updated November 19, 2026, https://l0g.fr/en/analysis/deutsche-bank-wingman-alerts-correspondent-banking/


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