China: behind the fall in crude imports, a new…

In May 2026, Chinese crude oil purchases fell to their lowest level in eight years. The figure is spectacular, but reading it requires distinguishing three phenomena: the disruption of Gulf flows, the economic arbitrage of refiners and the structural erosion of fuel demand.

After a record of 11.55 million barrels a day (m b/d) in 2025, then 11.99m b/d over January-February 2026, Chinese imports fell back to 11.77m b/d in March, 9.36m b/d in April and only 7.79m b/d in May, according to Chinese customs and Reuters. This last volume, 33.08 million tonnes, represents a decline of about 29% year on year.

Taken in isolation, the figure might suggest that the world’s largest importer has just passed its oil peak. That would be too quick: the decline is first the product of a supply shock and a refusal to pay top price for the marginal barrel.

After the massive stockpiling of early in the year, the decline concentrates on April and May 2026.

Hormuz broke the supply chain

The first factor is physical. The near-paralysis of the Strait of Hormuz after the conflict with Iran began dried up part of the Gulf arrivals. In April, China is estimated to have received only 648,000 b/d of crude that had transited the strait, against 4.07m b/d on average between January and March, according to Kpler.

Refiners dependent on Middle Eastern grades could not immediately replace these barrels: Russian, African or American grades offer neither the same characteristics, nor the same transport times, nor always the same payment terms. The shock described in the analysis of the Asian bill of the Hormuz crisis therefore transmitted directly to Chinese terminals and refineries.

Beijing did not “destroy” four million barrels a day of consumption in a few weeks. It absorbed a supply shock by cutting purchases, refining runs and fuel exports. This distinction is essential: a decline caused by a maritime bottleneck can reverse faster than a durable contraction in final demand.

Refiners refused to pay for the marginal barrel

The Chinese reaction also stems from a price arbitrage. In May, the premium of Saudi Arab Light reached as much as $19.50 a barrel over regional references. Refiners preferred to cut their runs rather than turn overpriced crude into gasoline or diesel sold on a sluggish domestic market.

In April, crude throughput fell 5.8% year on year, to 13.3m b/d, its lowest level since August 2022. The utilisation rate fell to 63.6% and the average margin to -649 yuan a tonne. In May, runs fell further to 12.66m b/d, while inventories were drawn down only moderately.

This behaviour shows that Chinese imports have become an optimisation variable more than a simple mirror of GDP. Having accumulated cheap crude in 2025 and early 2026, China can defer its purchases when physical differentials spike. It fills its tanks when sanctioned or surplus barrels are discounted, then disappears from the spot market when security of supply becomes too costly.

A cyclical weakness against a structural mutation

The geopolitical shock does not, however, explain everything. Chinese road-fuel demand is already losing steam. The International Energy Agency estimates that the Chinese electric fleet avoided about 1m b/d of oil consumption in 2025, nearly 15% of what Chinese road transport would have consumed with a purely combustion fleet.

The rise of electric or LNG heavy trucks, high-speed rail and the persistent weakness of real estate also reduce diesel and gasoline growth. As early as 2024, crude imports had fallen 1.9%, the first annual decline outside Covid in two decades, before rebounding in 2025 on the back of refining and storage.

The right reading is therefore that of a cyclical shock amplified by a structural trend. The reopening of Hormuz and the gradual return of Gulf cargoes can trigger a rebound in arrivals. Asian flows were already picking up in June, but Chinese buyers stayed cautious in the face of high prices. To track the normalisation of the market rather than a monthly snapshot, our guide on reading the oil market sets out the main energy prices.

The balance of power has changed

The May fall does not mean China is giving up on oil. Petrochemicals, aviation and reserve-building will keep supporting purchases. But the country no longer plays the role of an automatic engine of world demand: each additional barrel depends more on refining margins, inventory levels and the rebate obtained than on GDP growth alone.

For OPEC+, the consequence is uncomfortable. The world’s main buyer now has enough inventory, diversification and marginal restraint to bide its time, cut its runs and protect its domestic market by limiting fuel exports. China does not yet set the world oil price alone, but it can refuse the price offered.

This is therefore not only a story of falling volumes. It is the sign that, on the physical market, part of the bargaining power has shifted from producers to the Chinese buyer.

Primary sources:

General Administration of Customs of China, “China’s Major Imports by Quantity and Value, Mar 2026”, 8 April 2026.
General Administration of Customs of China, “China’s Major Imports by Quantity and Value, Apr 2026”, 8 May 2026.
Reuters, “China’s 2025 oil imports, December inflows both hit record highs”, 13 January 2026.
Reuters, “China January-February crude imports surge on higher refinery throughput”, 10 March 2026.
Reuters, “China’s commodity imports show Hormuz impact as oil slides, metals rise”, 12 May 2026.
Reuters, “China’s April oil throughput hits lowest since August 2022, inventories rise”, 18 May 2026.
Reuters, “China’s imports of major commodities show price remains key driver”, 10 June 2026.
Reuters, “China did use crude stockpiles to ease Iran shock, but not that much”, 17 June 2026.
Reuters, “Asia has plenty of crude oil, but refined fuels remain tight”, 22 June 2026.
International Energy Agency, Global EV Outlook 2026, Outlook for electric mobility, 2026.
U.S. Energy Information Administration, “China, International energy analysis”, accessed 26 June 2026.
Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia University, “China’s Slowing Oil Demand Growth Is Likely to Persist and Could Impact Markets”, 13 November 2024.
Reuters, “China’s crude oil imports fall in 2024, first time in two decades outside of COVID”, 13 January 2025.