Blackouts: who pays to keep essential services running?

On 28 April 2025, at 12:33 p.m. Madrid time, a power outage hits mainland Spain and Portugal. At the heart of the financial system, infrastructure keeps working: the Eurosystem’s TARGET Services operate normally. In shops, however, completing a purchase depends on a till, a connection, a scale, a refrigerator or a fuel pump. Some of this equipment stops. The money remains recorded in bank accounts; the physical conditions that allow people to use it have changed. S03

That separation helps explain the preparedness campaigns now circulating across Europe. France is preparing a major blackout exercise. Norway’s Preparedness Week, running from 26 October to 1 November 2026, focuses on the loss of electronic communications. Sweden has expanded offline card payments. These initiatives address a shared capability: keeping essential services available while their usual infrastructure is out of action. S01 S13 S07

Every hour of independent operation rests on preparation carried out long before the power fails. It requires maintained equipment, available staff, accessible supplies and rules that allow people to work differently. Funding these resources involves operators, businesses, local authorities and households. Following a payment reveals how far that responsibility extends: all the way to someone actually obtaining what they need.

Every purchase depends on a chain of services

The study published on 4 December 2025 by three authors in Banco de España’s Payment Systems Department describes two outcomes occurring at the same time. Central infrastructure benefited from its redundant architecture and backup mechanisms. Commercial transactions encountered the constraints of the physical economy. The authors identify invoicing tools, computers and scales among the equipment whose unavailability prevented businesses from continuing to operate. S03

Understanding the problem means following a purchase in order. The customer must reach an open shop. The product must be available and fit for sale. The merchant must be able to establish its price, accept payment and hand it over. The bank participates in this process alongside other organisations whose continuity matters just as much. A backup connection protects one step; completing the purchase requires the others to remain possible.

Data and scope

Qualitative synthesis of Spain’s experience and Sweden’s procedure. Payment routes are alternatives subject to local conditions.

Looking at resilience this way changes what is being measured. The availability of a banking platform describes a piece of infrastructure or a group of systems. Whether a purchase can be completed describes an entire service. Connecting the two requires knowing which functions backup arrangements cover, how long they can operate and what alternatives are available.

The Spanish experience also provides a useful qualification about payment terminals. According to the data cited by the authors, their batteries generally had enough endurance to outlast this outage. The study’s conclusions place greater emphasis on communications, business closures and the inability to provide certain services. Before buying additional batteries, an organisation therefore needs to identify the precise constraint it wants to remove. S03

Spain’s card payments during the blackout

The study’s sector table tracks the value of card payments recorded from noon to the end of the day. On 28 April, these payments amounted to €340.2 million, compared with €756.8 million on 7 April, the reference day selected by the authors. The published change is −55%. Categories moved differently: −35% for large distribution and food businesses, −62% for restaurants and −46% for petrol stations. The chart preserves the categories and percentage changes published in the source. S03

Data and scope

Values in millions of euros, from noon to the end of the day on 28 April 2025 compared with 7 April 2025. Five of nine categories shown. Percentage changes follow the publication; displayed amounts are rounded. The window begins 33 minutes before the outage.

Complete table · EUR million · S03, Table 1

Category	7 April	28 April	Published change
Large distribution firms and food	225	147	−35 %
Retail trade	148	45	−69 %
Other categories	129	35	−73 %
Travel and entertainment	64	28	−56 %
Restaurants	69	26	−62 %
Supermarkets	46	17	−63 %
Petrol stations	43	23	−46 %
Hotels	32	19	−41 %
Rail passenger transport	0.8	0.2	−73 %
Total, all 9 categories	756.8	340.2	−55 %

These data show the decline in the value of card payments recorded within Redsys’s coverage. The decline may reflect purchases abandoned, postponed, shifted elsewhere or paid for another way. Distinguishing those paths requires evidence on the recovery and the alternatives customers used. The comparison covers card payments, one data provider and two dates; cash and some other transactions lie outside its scope. The authors have aggregate data, without the geographic detail needed to reconstruct each local situation. The measurement window also begins 33 minutes before the outage. S03

That distinction matters when estimating damage. A postponed car repair may generate revenue a few days later. A missed restaurant meal or spoiled stock follows a different path. Estimating lasting losses would require bringing together transactions, production volumes, destroyed inventories and replacement purchases. Payment data provide a valuable observation point; calculating losses requires that further work.

The same reasoning applies to competition. The authors describe better continuity at large retailers equipped with backup systems and, in some cases, offline payment capabilities. A business able to remain open may serve customers displaced from elsewhere. The cost of preparedness can therefore influence how sales are distributed during a crisis. Quantifying that advantage would require data on individual establishments, their equipment and their customers. S03

The network that helps restore the network

In France, telecoms regulator Arcep describes a loop of dependencies often missing from simple accounts of a blackout. Telecommunications need electricity. The electricity system uses telecommunications to operate. Teams repairing either network must reach the installations, secure the necessary permissions and work safely. Roads, power and communications come together in the same restoration effort. S05

Priorities then become decisive. One mobile site may make it possible to reconnect several others. The organisation restoring its electricity supply needs to understand that site’s importance to the telecoms network. Arcep draws attention to precisely this requirement: priorities set separately by each operator need to be reconciled to account for dependencies across networks. S05

Data and scope

Arrows show functional dependencies described by Arcep. This diagram explains the loop; outage durations and probabilities would require separate measurement.

Coordination has an economic value of its own. A team reaching the right access point, or power being restored in the right place, can make several existing investments useful again. Equipment already on site may otherwise remain idle while waiting for permission, fuel or a working connection. The ability to operate independently depends on how these resources come together during the incident.

Service continuity plans are therefore worth reading as commitments between organisations. A backup generator has to be available even when several clients request it at once, and someone must transport and refuel it. Procedures that remain usable while the usual telephone service is unreliable help turn contractual commitments into resources that can actually be mobilised.

The origin of the outage remains a separate part of the analysis. ENTSO-E’s final report on the Iberian event, published on 20 March 2026, identifies a combination of technical factors involving oscillations, voltage control and generation disconnections. French policies also address hostile threats. The two subjects meet in the analysis of consequences and restoration capabilities, while retaining their own evidence on causes. S04 S01

Funding a grid that can restart

Factsheet 4 of RTE’s 2025 ten-year network development plan puts figures on two preparedness programmes, also set out in its complete June 2025 report. It sets out approximately €150 million to strengthen telecommunications at sites essential to operating the electricity system, with a 2028 target. A separate €130 million programme covers the renewal and deployment of backup power, due for completion by 2029. These amounts and dates describe the plans published in 2025; their precise implementation status in October 2026 remains to be established. S06

Data and scope

Budgets and deadlines announced in the 2025 network development plan, factsheet 4, p. 39; complete June 2025 edition, p. 41. Implementation as of 28 October 2026 remains to be documented. The factsheet leaves the price basis of these amounts unspecified.

These programmes support the means to control the grid and restore electricity. Shops and homes involve other equipment and other expenditure. Establishing a national total would require documenting these different areas and their respective responsibilities.

Identifying who pays also requires separating two stages. The operator undertakes the investment. The arrangements for remunerating it then determine how its costs are recovered over time. For electricity networks, the tariff framework set by the French energy regulator, CRE, governs this process, balancing investment, service quality and costs to users. The final TURPE 7 decisions, published in March 2025, place climate adaptation and asset renewal among those considerations. S25

A backup investment may therefore be funded initially by an operator and subsequently covered by tariff revenue under the applicable regulatory framework. In a shop, its cost may be absorbed in margins or passed on through prices. A local authority may fund a public reception point from its budget. The initial expenditure and the ultimate economic burden answer different questions. The available public documents allow some of these funding paths to be traced; a complete allocation of the bill remains to be established.

Backup equipment can protect activities beyond its owner’s. A private investment decision considers revenue preserved; the community may also consider access to emergency assistance, public services and neighbouring businesses. Those benefits justify examining service obligations, shared resources and public funding, while comparing the costs and effectiveness of the options.

In Sweden, keeping trade moving requires an agreement on risk

Sweden’s offline payment arrangements show how preparedness can change both a technical operation and a financial responsibility. On 1 July 2026, the Riksbank announced that expanded offline options had come into effect for essential purchases: food, medicines and fuel at staffed petrol stations. The arrangements cover the vast majority of adult Visa and Mastercard cards issued by the participating institutions. They require a physical card and its PIN. S07

The central bank’s technical page, updated on 6 July, explains the process. When communications are unavailable, the chip can authorise a purchase locally within certain limits. The terminal stores a record. Once the connection returns, the transactions are sent to the payment acquirer, the provider that processes the merchant’s payments. The acquirer transfers the funds to the merchant; the issuing bank debits the customer and settles with the acquirer. The goods can thus be handed over before bank settlement. S22

Data and scope

Procedure described by the Riksbank. Eligibility, limits and acceptance rules frame the issuer’s risk. Any additional merchant funding need depends on payment timing and the contract. Seven days of transaction storage and power endurance are separate parameters.

The card has a cumulative limit separate from the per-purchase limit; online authorisation can reset it. Terminal storage covers an interruption of up to seven days. A transfer delayed beyond the usual schedule may tie up merchant liquidity, depending on the contract: this is an economic inference.

The agreement memo of 3 October 2025 sets out how risk is shared. It provides for a ceiling on each transaction, called a floor limit, up to which the merchant can accept an offline payment at the issuer’s risk under the agreed rules. The target is at least SEK 2,000. A separate cumulative limit stored on the chip governs successive purchases; its calibration is discussed with the Riksbank. The limits actually configured and the eligibility conditions remain decisive. S08

Authorising a purchase without the usual online checks requires someone to accept an exposure. The limit, card eligibility and network rules define that exposure. The threshold sought in the memo is an objective of the agreement. The documentation examined announces broad coverage, without providing a public inventory of every card or terminal.

If waiting for reconnection delays receipt of funds beyond the usual payment schedule, the merchant may need to finance that interval. This possible consequence depends on contractual terms, the length of the disruption and the business’s cash position. Its cost remains to be established. Offline operation allows goods to be handed over before financial processing; the time taken to receive the funds then becomes another condition of business continuity. S22

Physical resources retain their importance. The terminal needs power, the right configuration and the ability to store transactions. The shop needs the product and the staff. The horizon of up to seven days envisaged in the Swedish arrangements concerns communications outages and transaction storage. The equipment’s electrical endurance has to be secured separately. S08 S22

Banknotes have a supply chain too

Preparing with cash may seem more familiar. In March 2026, the Riksbank recommended a benchmark of SEK 1,000 per adult for a week’s essential purchases, adjusted to the household’s needs and means. It encourages regular cash use to keep the distribution and acceptance network functioning. The recommendation connects personal reserves to a shared infrastructure. S09

Sweden is also acting on the retail side. A law that entered into force on 1 July 2026 requires food shops and pharmacies with staffed checkouts to accept cash under the prescribed conditions. Exceptions include security concerns and handling costs that would jeopardise the continued operation of the outlet. The legislation makes a trade-off visible: ensuring access to a payment method while taking account of the viability of the businesses accepting it. S10

Banknotes already in someone’s possession can settle a purchase without an electronic connection. Replenishing them nevertheless requires cash machines, banks, cash carriers and procedures. Banco de España’s account, published in April 2026, describes the coordination of this chain during the outage and the days that followed. Its effectiveness also depends on local access: an ATM stocked with banknotes must remain usable and accessible when the customer needs it. S23

Recommended amounts therefore need to retain the scenarios on which they were based. In the Netherlands, the benchmark of €70 per adult and €30 per child comes from work by Nibud for participants in the payment system. Its May 2025 report explicitly assumes that electricity remains available during the 72-hour payment disruption. It covers essential purchases and some travel, with daily life continuing as far as possible. Physical and logistical barriers to reaching shops fall outside its calculation. S11 S12

That methodological detail changes how the figure should be read. Assessing a recommendation requires knowing which services remain available in the scenario behind it. A cash reserve addresses the need to pay. Stocks address the need to have a product available. Backup power addresses the need to keep equipment running. These protections can complement one another, with different costs and operating conditions.

A Banco de España survey published on 26 October 2026 shows the importance people attach to cash: 71% of the adults surveyed identify protection against electronic failures or fraud among its advantages, compared with 62% in the 2025 edition. Fieldwork ran from 11 December 2025 to 9 July 2026, with 4,682 adults in the main sample. The survey measures perceptions. The observed change combines failures and fraud; attributing it to the blackout alone would require a different method. S16 S17

Knowing the advice and being able to follow it

The recent campaigns build on preparation already under way. The European strategy presented on 26 March 2025 brings together household supplies for at least 72 hours, essential services, critical stocks and cooperation with businesses. In France, the guide Tous responsables was published in November 2025. The government’s July 2026 policy document combines a blackout exercise, supplies and critical roles. The July document announced the exercise for 2027; the updated operational timetable remains to be confirmed. S02 S19 S01

The advice to households creates a buffer during which emergency services can concentrate their resources. Putting it into practice depends on residents’ capabilities and the services still operating around them. Housing space, available cash, mobility and health needs then become part of the analysis. The documents examined identify these questions; measuring their social implications requires further data on households and their surroundings.

Norway offers a glimpse of the distance between public awareness and reported preparedness. In the Norstat survey published by DSB and Nkom on 26 October 2026, 90% of respondents know the recommendation to be self-sufficient for a week. Asked a separate question, 31% consider their household well or very well prepared for a prolonged outage of mobile networks and the internet. Finally, 29% know where to obtain municipal information when these networks are unavailable or disrupted. S14

Data and scope

Norstat web panel for DSB: 1,056 adults in Norway; weeks 42 and 43 of 2026; published on 26 October. Answers are self-reported. Every bar uses a zero-to-100% scale.

These responses illuminate three dimensions: knowing a recommendation, assessing one’s preparedness and knowing where to find local information. They come from a web panel of 1,056 adults surveyed during weeks 42 and 43 of 2026. These reported answers provide a starting point for practical tests: whether residents can identify and reach the information point, and whether staff will be available to open it. S14

Norway’s municipal survey, published in February 2026, adds to the picture. Among the 318 respondents to the question about exercising alternative means of communication, 197 say no exercise had been held and nine report an exercise involving residents. DSB presents its survey as a collection of reported information about municipal preparedness. Performance during an actual crisis would require separate observation. S15

Resilience has to reach the people using the service

A business may have a sound plan while depending on a supplier whose service has stopped. An operator may restart equipment before users regain the conditions required for their activity. Examining these connections makes clear what funding buys: a period of operation, the ability to restore a service, accessible stocks or a commitment to accept payments. Each safeguard needs to specify the service it covers, its cost and who benefits.

The request for households to prepare gains its full meaning when connected to this organisation. The merchant knows which payment methods it can accept. The operator knows which sites to restore first to support other networks. The municipality has a publicised information point whose operation has been rehearsed. Equipment, contracts and familiar procedures together make the service possible.

For the announced French exercise, the most informative results will concern these relationships: functions actually maintained, dependencies discovered, restoration times and corrective work begun. Sensitive details can remain protected while a public assessment explains the method and progress. The promise of resilience will become more precise as announced hours are connected to services, users and resources that can be verified.

Method and scope

This documentary investigation has a cut-off date of 28 October 2026 and draws on institutional publications and public data. The Spanish results describe the April 2025 outage; the RTE programmes retain the planning baseline published in 2025; surveys retain their own fieldwork dates and respondent bases. The economic mechanisms developed in the text are an analysis of those documents. The work is documentary, with no interviews, site visits or payment-terminal tests.

The six figures are original l0g creations. The quantitative data, units, rounding conventions and source references appear in the captions and expandable tables. The diagrams represent documented dependencies or procedures. The national cost of preparedness, the exact coverage of Swedish retailers and the implementation of the two RTE programmes remain to be established. Recommended durations are treated as preparedness objectives; actual restoration times depend on the incident.

Service continuity and payment acquiring

Service continuity. The ability to maintain a function that is useful to its user, together with the equipment, people and partners it requires.

Payment acquirer. The provider that processes card transactions for a merchant and participates in the transfer of funds to that merchant. It is distinct from the issuer that provides the customer’s card.

Further reading

Google Cloud outage: the common risk behind the banks follows a shared dependency in finance. Electricity adequacy: the limits of the ENTSO-E model examines the scope of an electricity-availability indicator.

Sources

The documents retain their publication dates, respondent bases and scope. Interpretation and limitations appear in the article and the entries below.

1. S01 · Gouvernement français / SGDSN · 2026-07-08 · Accessed: 2026-10-28Comité interministériel pour la résilience nationale · Dossier de presse
   Passages and scope

   Printed pp. 19–20 (supplies and blackout exercise), p. 32 (critical personnel), p. 35 (local and business preparation).

   Announcement of a major blackout exercise, preparation of essential supplies and identification of critical jobs in continuity plans. The original dossier places the exercise in the following year, 2027.

   Planning document. The updated operational timetable and implementation remain to be confirmed. The legal application of the proposed strategic-stock measure requires separate verification.

   Related publication · 1

2. S02 · European Commission / DG ECHO · 2025-03-26 · Accessed: 2026-10-28EU Preparedness Union Strategy to prevent and react to emerging threats and crises
   Passages and scope

   Key objectives: essential societal functions; population preparedness; public-private cooperation.

   The strategy combines household supplies for at least 72 hours, essential-service continuity, critical stocks, exercises and cooperation with businesses.

   Strategy and announced actions. Implementation and household obligations require examination of the relevant legislation and progress reports.

   Related publication · 1

3. S03 · Banco de España · Financial Stability Review 49; Lourdes Cremades, Álvaro Esandi and Miguel Pérez · 2025-12-04 · Accessed: 2026-10-28The impact of the 28 April 2025 blackout on Spain’s payment systems
   Passages and scope

   Printed pp. 43–46 (business constraints and batteries); Table 1 p. 48 (PDF p. 7); p. 52 (TARGET); pp. 54–55 (conclusions).

   Continuity of central infrastructure, physical constraints on trade and card-payment values recorded within Redsys’s data coverage. Table 1 reports €340.2m versus €756.8m and a published change of −55%, with separate sector categories.

   Aggregate card data within Redsys coverage; geographic microdata are unavailable. Other payments, GDP and lasting losses require separate measures. Published percentage changes can differ from calculations on rounded amounts. The authors explicitly reserve the positions of Banco de España and the Eurosystem.

   Related publication · 1

   Related publication · 2

4. S04 · ENTSO-E · 2026-03-20 · Accessed: 2026-10-28ENTSO-E publishes Expert Panel final report on 28 April 2025 blackout in Spain and Portugal
   Passages and scope

   Final expert-panel report announcement: findings on interacting causes and recommendations.

   The final-report announcement identifies interacting technical factors: oscillations, voltage and reactive-power control, operational practices and generation disconnections.

   The findings concern the Iberian event. Attributing the causes of another incident or evaluating French exercises requires its own evidence.

5. S05 · Arcep · 2025-05 · Accessed: 2026-10-28La résilience des réseaux de communications électroniques · Réseaux du futur, note de synthèse
   Passages and scope

   pp. 6–12 (organisation and fragmentation); pp. 20–22 (restoration and cross-network interdependencies).

   Reciprocal dependencies between power and telecommunications; road access, authorisations and repair safety; need to align restoration priorities across operators.

   Qualitative analysis of dependencies. National probabilities, site autonomy and crisis performance require additional measurements; cyber and sabotage scenarios also have their own scope.

6. S06 · RTE · 2025 · Accessed: 2026-10-28SDDR 2025 · Fiche 4 : Renouvellement et modernisation des réseaux de télécommunication et des moyens de pilotage du réseau en temps réel
   Passages and scope

   Printed pp. 34–39; both programme amounts and target dates on p. 39 (sixth PDF page). The amounts and deadlines are unchanged in the complete June 2025 report, p. 41.

   Approximately €150m for essential-site telecommunications, targeting 2028; €130m for renewing and deploying backup power, targeting 2029. Scope: RTE grid control and restoration.

   Budgets and deadlines planned in 2025. Implementation in October 2026 remains to be documented; the price basis and exact publication day of the standalone sheet remain unspecified. The scope is RTE grid control and restoration.

   Complete June 2025 report, p. 41

7. S07 · Sveriges Riksbank · 2026-07-01 · Accessed: 2026-10-28Offline card payments – the options are now expanding
   Passages and scope

   Announcement of implementation and description of eligible cards and essential purchases.

   Announced expansion of offline payments for food, medicines and staffed fuel stations; the vast majority of participating issuers’ adult Visa/Mastercard cards; physical card and PIN required.

   Institutional implementation announcement. Successful-test rates and precise retailer coverage remain to be established. The release describes offline Swish payments as a subject of study.

8. S08 · Sveriges Riksbank · 2025-10-03 · Accessed: 2026-10-28Utökade möjligheter att genomföra kortbetalningar offline i Sverige
   Passages and scope

   Memorandum, case 2025-01171, four pages; pp. 2–4, especially p. 3 for floor-limit and offline-limit parameters.

   Per-transaction limit at issuer risk, with a target of at least SEK2,000; a distinct cumulative chip limit; card and terminal adaptations; transaction retention during an interruption lasting up to seven days.

   Agreement objectives; actual parameters depend on cards and applicable rules. The memo leaves the amount of the cumulative limit unspecified. Seven days concerns transaction storage; power supply requires separate resources.

9. S09 · Sveriges Riksbank · 2026-03-04 · Accessed: 2026-10-28New recommendations for public payment preparedness
   Passages and scope

   Public recommendations: cash amount, diverse payment methods and regular cash use.

   A benchmark of SEK1,000 in cash per adult for one week of essential purchases, adjusted to needs and means; encouragement of regular cash use and diversified payment methods.

   Preparedness benchmark adjusted to household needs and means. Access to shops also depends on their ability to operate. The horizon and assumptions differ from the Dutch model.

   Related publication · 1

10. S10 · Sveriges riksdag / Svensk författningssamling · 2026-05-27 · Accessed: 2026-10-28Lag (2026:769) om skyldighet för livsmedelsbutiker och apotek att ta emot kontant betalning; The possibility to use cash to be improved (FiU39)
    Passages and scope

    Law 2026:769, sections 1–3; parliamentary announcement on adoption and effective date.

    Conditional cash-acceptance duty for grocery shops and pharmacies with staffed tills; payment limits and exceptions concerning safety and the viability of the outlet.

    The publication date used is the parliamentary announcement; the law was issued the next day. The text provides for a limit of 0.1 price base amount and 25 coins, as well as exceptions. Opening during an outage depends on the shop’s physical resources.

    Related publication · 1

11. S11 · De Nederlandsche Bank / National Forum on the Payment System · 2025-05-20 · Accessed: 2026-10-28NFPS advice: prepare for a three-day disruption of electronic payments
    Passages and scope

    Advice to households and retailers on 72-hour payment disruption.

    Benchmark of €70 per adult and €30 per child, which can be built gradually; alternative payment methods and change for retailers.

    Advice for payment disruption. The Nibud model S12 assumes electricity remains available. Banking risk and the full cost of power autonomy require different assessments.

12. S12 · Nibud, commissioned by De Nederlandsche Bank for the National Forum on the Payment System · 2025-05 · Accessed: 2026-10-28Advies minimumbedrag contant geld in huis voor noodsituaties
    Passages and scope

    Scenario assumptions and calculation method; household-budget table on p. 5.

    The model assumes available electricity, disrupted digital payments and ATMs, continued daily activities, empty cupboards and some essential travel. Physical or logistical obstacles to accessing shops are not quantified.

    Normative calculation based on a scenario, time horizon and inflation assumptions. Particular needs can require a larger amount; observed blackout costs require separate study.

13. S13 · DSB · Original publication date unspecified · Accessed: 2026-10-28Egenberedskapsuka 2026
    Passages and scope

    Campaign dates, theme and municipal preparation instructions.

    The 2026 campaign focuses on communication when electronic services fail, including physical information points, municipal plans and exercises.

    Campaign programme. Surveys S14 and S15 describe reported preparedness among residents and municipalities, retaining their respective dates and respondent bases.

14. S14 · DSB / Nkom; Norstat survey commissioned by DSB · 2026-10-26 · Accessed: 2026-10-28DSB og Nkom: Slik bør du forberede deg på at nettet forsvinner
    Passages and scope

    Survey findings and methodology in the 26 October 2026 release.

    90% know the one-week recommendation; 31% rate their household well or very well prepared for prolonged mobile/internet loss; 29% know where to obtain municipal information if those networks are disrupted.

    Three separate self-reported questions. The source describes the panel as representative; physical endurance and performance in a crisis require tests or observation.

15. S15 · DSB · 2026-02 · Accessed: 2026-10-28Kommuneundersøkelsen 2026 · Hovedrapport, uten kommentarer
    Passages and scope

    p. 6 (planning question, n=338); p. 7 (exercise question, n=318); methodological guidance on the DSB survey page.

    Among 318 municipalities answering the alternative-communication exercise question, 197 report no exercise and nine report an exercise involving residents. DSB describes the survey as self-report.

    Respondent bases differ by question. DSB distinguishes reported preparedness from actual crisis-management ability. The February survey precedes the October 2026 campaign.

    Related publication · 1

16. S16 · Banco de España / Ipsos · 2026-10-26 · Accessed: 2026-10-28Estudio sobre hábitos en el uso del efectivo 2026 · Informe ejecutivo
    Passages and scope

    PDF p. 56, question P34_PG (perceived cash advantages); p. 62 (methodology).

    71% of adults in the main sample cite protection against electronic failures or fraud as a cash advantage, compared with 62% in 2025; survey methods and bases.

    Perceptions and multiple responses; the wording combines failures and fraud. The 5,038 interviews include a supplementary sample of 356 people, separate from the main base of 4,682. Fieldwork precedes the October publication; causal attribution to the blackout requires another method.

17. S17 · Banco de España · 2026-10-26 · Accessed: 2026-10-28El efectivo mantiene su importancia como medio de pago y refugio ante imprevistos y fallos electrónicos
    Passages and scope

    p. 1 (publication date and interview totals); p. 2 (62% to 71% finding).

    Confirms survey publication on 26 October 2026 and the rise from 62% to 71% in perceived protection against electronic failures or fraud.

    Summary of report S16. Both publications describe the same survey; detailed respondent bases appear in the report.

18. S19 · Gouvernement français / Service d’information du Gouvernement · 2025-11-20 · Updated: 2026-08-14 · Accessed: 2026-10-28Tous responsables : un guide pour mieux faire face aux risques
    Passages and scope

    Guide announcement and household-preparedness recommendations.

    Guide publication in November 2025; household preparation for 72 hours, solidarity and first aid while emergency services may be overwhelmed.

    Initial publication was in 2025, followed by an update in 2026. The 72 hours is a preparedness objective; actual restoration depends on the incident and resources available.

    Related publication · 1

19. S22 · Sveriges Riksbank · Original publication date unspecified · Updated: 2026-07-06 · Accessed: 2026-10-28Offline payments
    Passages and scope

    Technical explanation of local authorisation, terminal storage and processing after reconnection.

    The chip authorises locally within specified limits and the terminal retains the transaction. Upon reconnection: submission to the acquirer, merchant credit, customer debit and settlement between issuer and acquirer.

    Description of the procedure. Contractual payout timing, cash-flow costs and terminal coverage remain to be established. Offline operation requires power and suitable configuration.

20. S23 · Banco de España · Carlos González Constán, Cash Department · 2026-04-27 · Accessed: 2026-10-28How do we pay when the power goes out? Spain’s blackout experience
    Passages and scope

    Operational discussion of ATMs, existing cash holdings, central-bank coordination and replenishment.

    Cash already held can be used without a live connection, but replenishment depends on a physical chain. The post describes coordination among the central bank, banks and cash carriers during and after the outage.

    Institutional account. Actual ATM access depends on local conditions. Study S03 details digital payments; banknote flows and household spending have different scopes.

21. S25 · Commission de régulation de l’énergie · 2025-03-20 · Updated: 2025-03-26 · Accessed: 2026-10-28La CRE publie ses décisions finales sur le tarif d’utilisation des réseaux publics d’électricité (TURPE 7)
    Passages and scope

    Sections on tariff-period challenges, investment spending, remuneration of capital and the definition of TURPE; deliberation 2025-77 dated 13 March 2025.

    The tariff organises network cost recovery while balancing investment, service quality and user costs. Modernisation and climate adaptation are among the reasons for higher investment needs.

    Overall cost-recovery framework. Recovery of each resilience expense and implementation of the RTE programmes require separate examination; the document covers network economics.

    Related publication · 1